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As of writing this thesis, the copyright regulations of the European Union are going through 
a change. The new Digital Single Market directive1 (the DSM Directive, EU 2019/790) is in 
force and is awaiting national implementation. With the DSM Directive, EU attempts to 
bring its copyright regulations up to date with modern technological advancements.2 This 
directive adds to the existing EU copyright framework as well as slightly amends the 19-
year-old Information Society Directive3 (the InfoSoc. Directive, 2001/29/EC). The 
controversial DSM Directive has had many experts worried about the future of EU copyright 
law and the problems that the implementation of this directive may produce.4 At the center 
of the criticism have often been concerns around freedom of information, freedom of 
expression, preimposed censorship and possible damage to European economy5. 
One major criticism that has been voiced against the DSM Directive is the possible inability 
to rely on copyright exceptions in the future.6 The same copyright exceptions and limitations 
introduced in the InfoSoc. Directive apply to the DSM Directive, due to the latter directive 
being an extension to the EU copyright framework. However, new technological 
development has given birth to new ways of creation and exploitation of copyright-protected 
content not previously known when the InfoSoc. Directive was crafted. One example of this 
is the emergence of online content-sharing services and the plurality of user-generated 
content that they store, referred to in article 17 as well as recital 61 of the DSM Directive. 
These kinds of new phenomena do then raise the question whether the existing exceptions 
and limitations are properly suited for the digital age. 
According to the DSM Directive’s article 17(7)(a), quotation is one of the purposes under 
which users must be allowed to create, upload and make available content that contain 
copyright-protected content, authorized by the author or not. The quotation exception, like 
many other concepts of EU copyright law, has been a subject of development by the Court 
 
1 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and 
related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC 
2 See Juncker 2014, section 2. A Connected Digital Single Market 
3 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation 
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
4 See f.ex. SPARC Europe 2017, section The Open Letter – EU copyright reform threatens Open Access and 
Open Science & De Cock, 2017 
5 See Reda 2020 a, section EU copyright reform/expansion 
6 See f.ex. the Open Letter to Members of the European Parliament by Polish Digital Rights Organisations of 
10 July 2017 
2 
 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) over the years. Cases like Painer7, Metall Auf 
Metall8 and Spiegel Online9 have brought clarity and expanded on the concept of the 
quotation exception well beyond what is apparent from the wording of the provision it was 
introduced in, article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive. As a result, it is also evident that 
’’quotation’’ has become an autonomous concept of EU law, much in the same way as 
’’parody’’ in article 5(3)(k) of the InfoSoc. Directive (see Deckmyn10). 
As EU copyright law is experiencing winds of change, many of the existing concepts therein 
call for re-examination. With new technology come new ways to innovate and create. These 
new ways had not necessarily been considered when the existing rules on EU copyright were 
crafted.  In relation to the quotation exception, it is then relevant to ask whether it is equipped 
to handle the challenges of the digital age – namely, the ones identified in the DSM Directive. 
This calls for an in-depth analysis of both the quotation exception as well as the DSM 
Directive’s purpose, goals and relevant provisions. 
1.2 Research Questions 
These topics shall be addressed and answered with the following two research questions. 
The first question is as follows: what is quotation as an autonomous concept of EU copyright 
law? Answering this question is crucial for understanding the quotation exception. As 
already mentioned, CJEU rulings, such as Metall Auf Metall and Spiegel Online, give the 
impression that the quotation copyright exception is an autonomous concept of the EU.11 
This would also be consistent with article 5(3) of the InfoSoc. Directive. Parody, article 
5(3)(k), has already been established as an autonomous concept of EU law. Nothing in the 
wording suggests that parody is exceptional compared to other exceptions and limitations 
introduced therein, such as the quotation exception. The thesis, however, does not merely 
focus on the meaning of the term ’’quotation’’ in EU law. Rather, the ’’autonomous 
concept’’ in the research question is understood in a wider sense. In addition to the term 
’’quotation’’, the thesis also examines the conditions, the terms and the expressions used in 
article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive. The purpose is to explain the meaning of all these 
subjects in article 5(3)(d) as they are understood in EU law. Thus, to understand quotation 
as an autonomous concept of EU law is to explore these sub-questions: How is ’’quotation’’ 
 
7 C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798 
8 C-476/17 Pelham and Others ECLI:EU:C:2019:624 (Metall Auf Metall) 
9 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625 
10 C-201/13 Deckmyn ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132 
11 Jongsma 2019, p. 24 
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defined in EU law? What are the quotation exception’s scope and interpretive limits? How 
extensive is its level of harmonization and how much room is left for national discretion and 
interpretation? By exploring these themes, the concept of quotation as it is understood in EU 
law can be laid out to a satisfactory extent. Only through researching the concept of quotation 
can its potential be fully realized. This is an important first step that must be taken before 
the provision can be properly analyzed against challenges of the future. 
The second question is as follows: is the quotation exception compatible with online content-
sharing services? This question calls for further pretext. Article 17 of the DSM Directive 
lays out certain rules for online content-sharing service providers in relation to using 
copyright-protected content. According to article 17(4), the service providers have a duty to, 
through their best efforts, prevent unauthorized communications to the public of protected 
works on their services. Article 17(7), however, states that these efforts must not result in 
the unavailability of non-infringing works, including those covered by a copyright exception. 
Taking this as well as the concept of quotation into account, it is relevant to ask how well 
the quotation exception fits the digital age. This requires considering the scope of the 
quotation copyright exception against the nature of content typically encountered on online 
content-sharing services. One must also consider the history of CJEU case law, the goals of 
the DSM Directive, the weight of fundamental rights in EU copyright law and the existing 
EU copyright framework. In order to evaluate the quotation exception’s compatibility with 
article 17, several factors must be explored. What kind of user-generated content the 
quotation exception covers? Does the exception have any clear blind spots in relation to this 
kind of content? Does the provision leave room for interpretation in the wake of the 
challenges brought by the digital age? Would it sufficiently secure the goals of the DSM 
Directive as well as the relevant fundamental rights? Once these themes have been 
researched, only then can it truly be determined whether the quotation exception is 
compatible with online content-sharing services. 
1.3 Methods 
This thesis uses the legal dogmatic method of research. Thus, the approach of the research 
takes an internal perspective in the EU legal system, which is not only the subject of the 
inquiry, but also the provider of the normative framework of the analysis. As a result, the 
law is intelligible in its own terms. In spirit of legal dogmatism, it is important to see the law 
as a system. The results of the research are produced through rigorous analysis of all the 
relevant elements in the system. The subject of interpretation and systemization is the present 
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law. It is also important to accommodate new developments and case law against the 
background of societal change.12 
The aim of legal dogmatism is to describe the existing law in a certain field (in this case, EU 
copyright law) as it stands in the present day. A legal dogmatic research aspires to be as 
neutral and as consistent as possible in order to describe how the law reads. Legal doctrine 
grasps the normative complexity of the law in order to help the reader understand and solve 
practical problems. As a result, the law is rationalized and stabilized in order to keep it 
intelligible to the reader. On top of this descriptive function, legal dogmatism also has a 
prescriptive nature. Out of a set of complex norms for human behavior, which is, arguably, 
what the law essentially is, legal doctrine articulates what these norms are. Information 
produced through legal dogmatic research can act as the basis of future legislation, lex 
ferenda. As any systematization of law can have practical consequences, norms are, at least 
in continental European legal tradition, produced autonomously within the legal system 
itself. Lastly, legal dogmatism can be seen to serve as a justification for the existing law. In 
spirit of the internal perspective of legal dogmatic research, the law is presented as a self-
contained system of mutual reference. The validity of norms therein can then be justified by 
reference to this system. To put it simply, if the rule doesn’t fit into the system, it is not a 
law. This is due to legal system being already justified by its own coherence.13 
Keeping all of this in mind, it is important to realize that EU law exists within the union’s 
own unique legal system.14 Indeed, EU legal system is often described as a sui generis -
system, containing elements from national systems and international organizations.15 Legal 
principles have always had a great significance in interpreting the law.16 This is often 
considered one of the special features of EU legal system. A typical way to systemize EU 
legal sources is to make a distinction between primary sources and secondary sources. This 
distinction also determines the hierarchy relation between different norms. Primary sources 
consist of foundational treaties and treaties comparable to foundational treaties. These 
 
12 Smits M-EPLI 2015, p. 5-7 
13 Smits M-EPLI 2015, p. 8-12 
14 See C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, p. 12. See also C-6/64 Costa v. Enel 
ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, p. 593, where the CJEU ruled that ’’By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the 
EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral 
part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply.’’ In this case, the 
CJEU also established the supremacy of EU law against national law.  
15 Talus – Penttinen 2016, p. 223 
16 Raitio 2016, p. 196 
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include EU’s foundational values (the Treaty on European Union17 aka. EUT article 2), 
general principles of EU law as well as basic & human rights, foundational treaties of the 
EU (EUT & the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union18 aka. TFEU along with 
their protocols), international agreements, EU secondary norms (regulations, directives & 
decisions), delegated regulatory acts, implementing acts, CJEU decisions, actions of the 
member states in implementing EU law and legally non-binding norms such as guidelines 
and statements. Although not exhaustive, this list contains the legal sources in the EU legal 
system in (roughly) hierarchical order.19 
Interpreting EU law can be difficult due to its unique nature. EU law is expanding and 
changing all the time. EU also has over 20 official languages, which sometimes causes 
translative problems. The union also uses its own terminology that differs from that of the 
member states. Regulatory work in the EU is also often slow and foundational EU treaties 
do not give priority to any legal interpretive method. Nevertheless, EU law is, first and 
foremost, interpreted through literal interpretation. Although systematic and teleological 
ways of interpretation always have their place, their relevance is most profound when the 
wording of the regulation is unclear and vague. It is important to note that all the official 
languages of the union are equally probative, as laid out in EUT article 55, which may, at 
worst, only add to the complexity of the system. Certain judicial terms may also have 
different meanings on union level even if they have originally been imported from a member 
state’s law.20 
Systematic interpretation means that EU norms must be interpreted within their context and 
taking into account EU law as a whole. EU norms are to be interpreted as a part of the legal 
structure they belong to in order to maintain the coherence and efficiency of EU law.21 
Interpretation of EU law must not undermine its validity, but rather be in harmony with its 
surrounding legal structure. Secondary sources need to be interpreted in light of the primary 
sources. An individual article of a foundational treaty is to be analyzed as a part of a larger 
body of foundational treaties. Teleological approach, however, attempts to fulfill the purpose 
 
17 The Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) (OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 13) 
18 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version) (OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, p. 47) 
19 Talus – Penttinen 2016, p. 225-234 and Raitio 2016, p. 198 
20 Talus – Penttinen 2016, p. 237-239 
21 See joined cases C-402/07 and C-432/07 Sturgeon & others ECLI:EU:C:2009:716, para 47, where the CJEU 
emphasized that ’’…a Community act must be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its 
validity…’’ and ’’…where a provision of Community law is open to several interpretations, preference must 
be given to that interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness.’’ 
6 
 
of the law, its effet utile. The norm is approached through its purpose and objective, which 
is important in EU law. Teleological interpretation is appropriate in a dynamic legal 
environment that is always changing. If a literal interpretation would produce contradictory 
results to the norm’s purpose and objective, teleological interpretation shall be utilized. 
Unlike it is often the case in national law, in EU law, a norm’s purpose and objective isn’t 
merely derived from its preparatory work and the ’’will of the legislator’’, but from the 
purpose and the objectives of the European Union in general. In teleological interpretation 
one must consider the entirety of EU’s primary sources and legal principles. It is then 
important to consider not only these general objectives of the union, but also the time point 
of the interpretation (due to the dynamic nature of EU law).22 
This thesis utilizes analytical legal dogmatism while considering the unique nature of the 
EU legal system. Although the primary form of interpretation shall be literal, it cannot ignore 
systematic and teleological points of view. Rather, a harmony among these three ways of 
interpretation is pursued. The terms and expressions used in legal norms are given the 
meaning they are generally understood to have in EU law. When the wording of a norm is 
vague or unclear, it is interpreted considering its context and the legal structure it inhabits in 
as a whole so that its validity isn’t undermined and harmony within the surrounding legal 
structure is maintained. Furthermore, a norm is always interpreted in light of the purpose 
and objective of not only the norm itself, but the union in general. If a literal interpretation 
of a norm would lead to a result clearly contradictory to its purpose and objective, precedence 
must be given to a teleological approach. 
1.4 Limitations 
This thesis focuses on the quotation exception in EU copyright law and, more importantly, 
on ’’quotation’’ as an autonomous concept of EU law. This requires examining all of the 
requirements and expressions in article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive as well as the 
meanings attributed to the terms therein. As a result, the thesis also reveals what are the 
frames within which member states are expected to operate when transposing and 
interpreting the provision. This thesis does not focus on how different member states 
themselves have incorporated the quotation exception in their copyright law, unless it helps 
 
22 Talus – Penttinen 2016, p. 240-244. See also C-22/70 ERTA ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, paras 40-41, an example 
of teleological interpretation by the CJEU: ’’The objective of this review is to ensure, as required by article 
164, observance of the law in the interpretation and application of the Treaty. It would be inconsistent with this 
objective to interpret the conditions under which the action is admissible so restrictively as to limit the 
availability of this procedure merely to the categories of measures referred to by article 189.’’ 
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in getting a better understanding of the quotation exception in EU law. When it comes to the 
second research question, the thesis focuses mainly on article 17 of the DSM Directive and, 
in particular, its 7th paragraph. Article 17 deals with the use of protected content on online 
content-sharing services with its 7th paragraph focusing on the exceptions and limitations to 
the obligations laid out in the article. It is also necessary to research the purpose and objective 
of the article as well as the DSM Directive in general. Still, all of this will be done through 
the lens of the quotation exception and not so much through other exceptions and limitations, 
unless it provides information that better helps understand the relationship between the 
quotation exception and article 17 of the DSM Directive. Therefore, the quotation exception 
will be compared against article 17 of the DSM Directive, the relevant recitals of the 
directive as well as the directive’s preparatory works to the extent that they provide nuance 
to the topic. 
1.5 Structure 
The thesis begins with a brief examination on how European copyright has evolved and what 
kind of features it is grounded upon. In order to get a satisfactory understanding of European 
copyright tradition, the time frame of this examination takes place from 1400s onwards. In 
order to not to diverge from the theme of the thesis, the focus on the development of 
European copyright prior to EU initiatives is kept brief and on a general level. This includes 
going through the emergence of copyright as a concept in Europe, what kind of events led 
up to it and what was the rationale behind it. The thesis will then focus on the international 
development of copyright. This is necessary because copyright law has, for a very long time, 
been international. Most existing copyright legal structures – including that of the EU’s – is 
influenced by international copyright law. Thus, the thesis then examines the most 
significant international treaties on copyright with the main focus being on the provisions 
relevant to copyright exceptions and limitations – in particular, the quotation exception. The 
Berne Convention23, the TRIPS Agreement24 and the WIPO Copyright Treaty25 are the three 
most important agreements in this regard. 
The focus then shifts to the European Union’s own copyright framework. At first, it is ideal 
to examine the union’s first documented initiatives towards harmonizing copyright law and 
 
23 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9th of September 1886, in force 4th of 
December 1887, latest amendment 28th of September 1979, in force 19th of November 1984 
24 The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh, Morocco, 15th of April 
1994, latest amendment 23rd of January 2017 
25 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Geneva, Switzerland, 20th of December 1996, in force 6th of March 2002 
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the reasons behind them. This is done through researching the relevant preparatory works, 
the travaux preparatoires of EU copyright legislation with the emphasis being on those 
concerning the InfoSoc. Directive. This includes the relevant Green Papers as well as the 
official documents related to them. Afterwards, the thesis focuses on the InfoSoc. Directive 
itself.  The examination begins with giving an overview of the directive as well as explaining 
its purpose and objectives, its telos. This is done by going through the relevant recitals 
concerning the overall telos of the directive as well as those concerning the exceptions and 
limitations. The purpose and objectives of the exceptions and limitations deserve to be 
researched intensively and in-depth as, what is true for exceptions and limitations in general 
is also true for the quotation exception. Lastly, before moving on to article 5(3)(d) of the 
InfoSoc. Directive itself, it is also ideal to briefly examine the rules and the customs for 
interpreting EU law. All this background work is important for answering the research 
questions because, due to the unique nature of EU legal system, the provisions therein must 
be interpreted in light of the legislative framework they inhabit. 
Thereafter, the thesis focuses on article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive, the quotation 
exception. This section consists of going through the quotation exception in-depth. This 
includes analyzing the wording of the provision, examining the meaning of ’’quotation’’ in 
EU law, breaking down the provision to all its components and researching them condition 
by condition, expression by expression. This extensive analysis is heavy with case law as 
well as corresponding judicial literature. After this, the first research question – that is, what 
is quotation as an autonomous concept of EU law – can be confidently answered. 
After that, the research focuses on the second research question. This will begin with an 
overview of the DSM Directive, its preparatory works as well as the official documents 
related to it. In particular, attention is given to the telos of the directive, article 17 as well as 
online content-sharing services as a concept recognized by the directive. These findings are 
then compared to the results of the research done on the quotation exception in the earlier 
sections. Based on what has been discovered through the legal text, case law as well as 
judicial literature, the thesis then evaluates the quotation exception’s compatibility with 
online content-sharing services described in article 17 of the DSM Directive. In particular, 
the thesis seeks to identify possible shortcomings that the quotation exception might have in 
this regard. In addition, the research makes an assessment whether these shortcomings can 
be overcome through softer means (legal interpretation, case-by-case analysis) or are more 
robust means required (crafting new legislation, annulling existing legislation). After this, 
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the second research question – whether the quotation exception is compatible with online 
content-sharing services described in article 17 of the DSM Directive – can also be 
sufficiently answered. Finally, the research will reach its conclusion section which consists 
of a summary of the answers to the two research questions.  
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2. The Foundations of European Copyright 
2.1 Droit D’Auteur – the Roots of European Copyright Tradition 
As explained in section 1.5, to fully understand the copyright framework of the European 
Union, one must first study European copyright tradition. Although copyright law is very 
much international, different copyright legal orders tend to have characteristics tied to the 
legal systems they inhabit. These characteristics are often rooted in regional history and their 
importance must not be underestimated. In order to understand the nature of copyright as 
well as that of the exceptions and limitations to author’s rights in EU copyright law, it is 
necessary to first have an overview of European copyright history from its inception up until 
EU’s own copyright initiatives. 
Although artistic and literary works have existed since the very early times of human history 
(f.ex. art and symbolism in early history)26, copyright law is, in comparison, a fairly new 
concept. It wasn’t until the invention of printing that the first seeds of copyright law were 
planted in Europe, in the form of printing privileges.27 Due to mankind being able to mass-
produce books, printers and publishers required privileges for their respective undertakings 
so that third parties wouldn’t also begin similar projects. These kinds of printing privileges 
slowly spread all over Europe. This system of privileges created the first means for authors 
to secure their economic interests during a time when the conception of art moved towards 
individualism, promoting the author’s personality.28 In England, out of this system of 
privileges came eventually the exclusive right to make copies of a work – in other words, 
copyright. The first known copyright law in history, the Statute of Queen Anne29, was 
introduced in 1710. This statute gave the authors of books the exclusive right to print and 
sell their books for fourteen years from registration (and, if the author was still alive after 
these fourteen years, another fourteen years would be added to this duration).  
Eventually, almost every country that had begun industrialization introduced protection for 
author’s and inventors in the form of exclusive rights, following the example of England, 
France and the USA. It is important to note the difference between the Anglo-American and 
the continental European concept of copyright (the latter also known as droit d’auteur). The 
 
26 See f.ex. Haarmann 1996.  
27 Bently – Kretschmer, 2020, section Johannes of Speyer’s Printing Monopoly, Venice (1469) 
28 Haarmann 2005, p. 1-4 
29 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Author's or 
Purchasers of Such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned, Great Britain, Public General Acts 1709–
1710, 8 & 9 Anne, c. 19 
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intent behind the Anglo-American copyright regulation (for example, as it is reflected in the 
US Constitution30 Article I, Section 8, cl. 831) is not only to reward the author for innovative 
work, but also to advance the society’s interests. The Anglo-American approach to copyright 
is noticeably utilitarian. The continental European approach to the subject is very different. 
New works and inventions are worthy of protection merely because the authors and inventors 
had, according to European enlightenment philosophers, a natural ownership-like relation to 
their creations. In a way, these creations are an extension of their authors’ personalities. This 
also explains why the protection of moral rights is stronger and more deeply rooted in civil 
law countries compared to common law countries. The continental European approach to 
copyright is very author centered. It should be pointed out, however, that European droit 
d’auteur and Anglo-American copyright have gotten closer over the last decades and aren’t 
as incompatible to one another as they may have once been.32 
Post French Revolution conception of copyright, droit d’auteur, was to be the early model 
for later continental European copyright law. All privileges were overturned in place of a 
copyright law that is said to enshrine the author. Exclusive rights belong to the author due to 
the property being a product of their own intellectual creation. In French tradition, one could 
describe it as there being a sacred bond between the author and his creation. This is a stark 
contrast to the US copyright clause that, reflecting the Statute of Queen Anne, gives to the 
public interest as much importance as to that of the author’s, if not even more. This difference 
in philosophies between different copyright frameworks also explains why copyright 
legislation in author-centered continental European systems tend to be considerably more 
protective of author’s rights than their Anglo-American counterparts.33 
2.2 Internationalization of Copyright 
2.2.1 Berne Convention 
Although copyright law was at first strictly national (and in some ways still is), there were 
calls for universal copyright regulation as early as in the 19th century. The movement that 
began in an international Congress of Authors and Artists in Brussels in 1858 eventually 
concluded in 1883 in Berne, Switzerland. The conference, developed at the instigation of 
 
30 Constitution of the United States, 17th of September 1787, ratified 21st of June 1788 
31 US Constitution Article I, Section 8, cl. 8: ’’(The Congress shall have Power) To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries’’ (Underlines added). 
32 Haarmann 2014, p. 6-7. See also Goldstein – Hugenholtz 2010, p. 6-8 and 15-21. 
33 Ginsburg 1990, p. 991-996 
12 
 
Victor Hugo of the Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale, produced a universal 
copyright treaty consisting of ten articles. The final draft of the Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works came into force on December 5th, 1887. Since then, the 
Convention has been amended numerous times with the last amendment being from 1979.34 
The Berne Convention (later also ’’Berne’’ and ’’the Convention’’) is arguably the most 
important international copyright treaty in the world. It is governed by World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) and has been signed by 179 countries. It is aimed to protect 
literary and artistic works and the rights of their authors. The Convention’s most significant 
aspects are widely considered to be the three basic principles on which it is based on as well 
as the series of provisions determining the minimum protection to be granted. First, the 
national treatment principle in article 5(1) states that, when a work originates in one of the 
contracting states, it must be given the same level of protection in each of the contracting 
states that the latter grants its own nationals. Secondly, the automatic protection principle in 
article 5(2) prescribes that the enjoyment of the protection and the rights laid out in the 
Convention must not be conditional upon compliance of any formality. This principle applies 
to both the rights granted by the Convention as well as whatever rights the contracting states 
grant to their nationals currently or in the future. Finally, the principle of independent 
protection means that the protection of a work is independent of the existence of protection 
in the country of origin of the work. A contracting state can deny the protection of a work, 
however, if they provide a longer term of protection than the Convention requires and the 
protection in the country of origin has ceased.35 
There are several minimum requirements in the Berne Convention. Article 2(1) describes 
’’literary and artistic works’’ as every production in the literary, scientific and artistic 
domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression. In addition to containing 
certain exclusive rights to authors, Berne also introduces a set of provisions for exceptions 
and limitations. These include the quotation exception in article 10(1) as well as the three-
step-test in article 9(2) – both of which are later analyzed further. On top of substantive 
rights, the Convention also provides for strong moral rights (article 6bis). The author has the 
right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to the work, even after the transfer of economic rights to the work. 
 
34 Goldstein – Hugenholtz 2010, p. 33-34 
35 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 2020, section Summary of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) 
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2.2.2 TRIPS Agreement 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – the TRIPS  
Agreement (later also ’’TRIPS’’) – was initiated due to a stalemate in efforts to increase the 
minimum standards of the Berne Convention and other intellectual property treaties, along 
with growing frustration over weak enforcement measures.36 TRIPS solidified the 
importance of intellectual property as part of the multilateral trading system and was a result 
of intellectual property’s growing trade political significance37. The treaty adheres to the 
national treatment principle (article 3) as well as the most-favored-nation principle (article 
4), latter of which states that any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by a 
member state to nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the nationals of all other member states. 
According to article 9(1) of TRIPS, members must comply with articles 1-21 of the Berne 
Convention (Paris Act 1971). These articles encompass very significant provisions, such as 
the automatic protection principle, the three-step-test and the quotation copyright exception. 
It is through article 9(1) of TRIPS that the EU is obligated to follow these provisions of the 
Berne Convention as the EU is a member of the former, but not the latter. It is noteworthy 
that, according to the very same article 9(1) of TRIPS, members do not have rights or 
obligations in relation to the rights conferred under article 6bis of Berne or the rights derived 
therefrom – in other words, the provision concerning moral rights. 
2.2.3 WIPO Copyright Treaty 
Lastly, it is worthwhile to briefly visit the WIPO Copyright Treaty. This treaty is a special 
agreement under the Berne Convention that deals with the protection of works and the rights 
of their authors in the digital environment. Any contracting party must comply with the 
substantive portion of Berne 1971 Act – including EU. The treaty introduces two new 
subject-matters to be protected by copyright; computer programs and databases. In addition 
to the rights granted by the Berne Convention, the treaty also grants the right of distribution, 
the right of rental and a broader right of communication to the public. However, most 
interestingly – at least, in regard to the topic of this thesis – the treaty develops the three-
step-test provision from Berne further. This shall be explained shortly.38 
 
36 Goldstein – Hugenholtz 2010, p. 73 
37 Otten – Wager 1996, p. 393 




2.2.4 The Three-Step-Test 
The three-step-test is a general clause regulating exceptions and limitations. Due to its 
significance to the topic of this research, it is advisable to examine it more closely under a 
separate heading. As the name of the doctrine suggests, it consists of three identifiable steps 
that have to be met for an exception or limitation, or the use of an exception or limitation, to 
be valid. The test was first introduced to international copyright regulation by the Berne 
Convention in the Stockholm Act (1967). Article 9(2) of Berne reads as follows: 
’’It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the 
reproduction of such works in (1) certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction (2) does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and (3) 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.’’ (numbers 
added to indicate the ’’steps’’) 
The provision refers to the kind of reproduction of works not authorized by the author – in 
other words, copyright exceptions and limitations. These kinds of acts must be limited to 
certain special cases where such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work. The reproduction must also not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the author. The three-step-test was adopted as a response to the recognition of the general 
right to reproduction. The test was a compromise solution in place of a finite list of specific 
exceptions. As such, the three steps in the article are open for interpretation and have been 
utilized differently in different countries. Some countries view the three-step-test as a rule 
that national exceptions and limitations must adhere to, while others have adopted the test 
as a whole in their own national legislation, creating a kind of ’’fair dealing’’ doctrine that 
allows certain acts of reproduction of works on case-by-case basis.39 
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement reiterates the three-step-test introduced in Berne in 
article 9(2). It is also the only instance where TRIPS speaks of exceptions and limitations. 
Article 13 of the agreement, in its entirety, reads as follows: 
’’Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to (1) certain 
special cases which (2) do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and (3) 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.’’ (numbers 
added) 
The wording in Berne, however, focuses on authorization of reproduction of works whereas 
article 13 of TRIPS deals with exceptions and limitations as well as exclusive rights in 
general. Another interesting observation is the usage of the term ’’right holder’’ in place of 
Berne’s ’’author’’. Nevertheless, members of the TRIPS Agreement are still obligated to 
 
39 See Geiger – Gervais – Senftleben 2015, p. 167-169 and 173-176 
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follow article 9(2) of Berne, as per article 9(1) of the agreement. It is then likely that article 
13 of TRIPS merely reaffirms the three-step-test with terminology more suitable to the 
agreement rather than introduces a new version of it. Admittedly, the wording in TRIPS does 
extend the scope of the test further in comparison to that of Berne’s. 
The WIPO Copyright Treaty incorporates the three-step-test in article 10. Interestingly, the 
provision extends the test’s application to all rights – not just to reproduction of works. 
Indeed, the provision speaks of ’’rights granted to authors’’ on a general level both when 
applying the treaty itself and when applying the Berne Convention.  Furthermore, the Agreed 
Statement accompanying the treaty states that such exceptions and limitations, as established 
in national law in compliance with the Berne Convention, may be extended to the digital 
environment. Contracting states may even craft new exceptions and limitations appropriate 
to the digital environment. The extension or creation of new exception and limitations is 
allowed if the conditions of the three-step-test are met.40 
2.3 The Green Papers – First EU Copyright Initiatives 
Copyright initiatives as EU projects became more and more relevant towards the end of the 
80s. The reason for this, as is widely believed, is the steady increase in significance of 
information as an economic commodity. Harmonizing copyright law between the member 
states was in the union’s interest in order to guarantee the proper functioning of the internal 
market, which is one of the core objectives of the EU as per title IV of TFEU. To ensure the 
proper functioning of the single market, article 26 (1-2)41 of TFEU almost called for action 
on a union level in the field of copyright.42 
Article 114(1) of TFEU states that the parliament and the council shall adopt the measures 
for the approximation of the provisions which have as their object the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. Furthermore, article 36 states that provisions relating to 
the free movement of goods shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of – among other things – the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. This is due to article 345 prohibiting treaties that would 
prejudice the rules in the member states concerning property ownership, although the 
 
40 World Intellectual Property Organization 2020, section Summary of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
(1996) 
41 TFEU article 26(1): ’’The Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the 
functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties’’. Article 26(2): 
’’The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.’’ (Italics added) 
42 See Rosati 2013, p. 10-12 
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relationship between the free movement provisions and intellectual property hasn’t always 
been clear cut.43 Regardless, it is the viewpoint of EU that too empowered IP rights on 
national level can be a hinderance to the proper functioning of the internal market in the form 
of arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade. The CJEU has ruled numerous 
times that the application of national measures that hamper the free movement of goods or 
services is allowed only to the extent that is necessary to protect the ’’specific subject-
matter’’, which is understood as the essence of an intellectual property right.44 The CJEU 
has used this kind of reasoning in cases such as Deutsche Grammophon45 and Coditel46. 
After a series of similar cases47, it was becoming obvious to the union that copyright would 
play an important role in a functioning internal market. The first seeds for copyright 
harmonization were sown by the commission in June 1988, in the form a document called 
’’Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology: Copyright Issues Requiring 
Immediate Action’’48. The first chapter of the Green Paper is dedicated to explaining the 
basis for the initiative. The commission highlighted the importance of clearly defining the 
relationship of copyright and the internal market (1.1.2). Many copyright-related concerns 
were identified, not least of them being the challenges introduced by recent technological 
developments of that time (1.1.3). Indeed, the issues that the Commission considered the 
most urgent, among other things, were piracy, home copying of sound & audio-visual 
material and the protection available to computer programs and databases (1.6.2). 
The intention behind the initiative was to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market 
by eliminating obstacles and legal differences distorting these objectives. The intervention 
was deemed necessary in order to improve Europe’s competitiveness in areas of potential 
growth, such as media and information. The report also raised concerns around third party 
misappropriation of creative efforts and substantial investments within the community, 
 
43 See Rosati 2013, p. 12-14 
44 Van Eechoud & others 2012, p. 3 
45 C-78/70 Deutsche Grammophon ECLI:EU:C:1971:59. See para 11: ’’Although it permits prohibitions or 
restrictions on the free movement of products, which are justified for the purpose of protecting industrial and 
commercial property, Article 36 (of TFEU) only admits derogations from that freedom to the extent to which 
they are justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the specific subject-matter of such 
property’’ 
46 C-62/79 Coditel ECLI:EU:C:1980:84. See p. 897: ’’It (the Commission of the European Communities) 
considers that it is a matter of finding a way of reconciling the principle of freedom to provide services with 
the protection of the specific subject-matter of the copyright in question.’’ 
47 For more information, see Van Eechoud & others 2012, p. 3 and the cases mentioned therein 
48 COM (1988) 172, final 
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striking a fair balance between the interests of different stakeholders as well as the cross-
border impact that new technology has had on dissemination and reproduction techniques.49 
Harmonization efforts continued throughout the 90s. In 1994, the White Paper titled 
’’Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st 
Century’’ was published.50 This document marks the first time the term ’’information 
society’’ is used. It is introduced in the section discussing the changing society and new 
technologies.51 Information society is described as a society in which management, quality 
and speed of information are key factors to competitiveness. The report predicted the 
emerging technologies to dramatically change many aspects of economic and social life as 
well as to result in major gains in productivity and industry. In relation to intellectual 
property, the document deemed it necessary to extend intellectual property law to efficiently 
protect intellectual property52. The follow-up to the White Paper, The Bangemann report53, 
placed high priority on intellectual property rights in the wake of the information society, 
calling for common rules to be established and enforced by the member states.54 The follow-
up report saw intellectual property rights as important factors in developing a competitive 
European industry in the area of information technology as well as across a wide variety of 
industrial and cultural sectors. The Bangemann report also stated that Europe has a vested 
interest in maintaining a high level of protection of intellectual property. It also recognized 
the cross-border nature of these new phenomena with calls for regular world-wide 
consultation with all interested parties. 
This led to the commission’s communication on Europe’s way to the information society.55 
In it, the commission called for a review of IPR measures as well as an examination for the 
possible need for additional measures.56 The commission also announced an upcoming 
Green Paper on IPRs in the information society. The subsequent Green Paper on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society was published on July 19th, 1995.57 In it, the 
commission explains that the protection of copyright and related rights is vital to the internal 
 
49 Rosati 2013, p. 15-16 
50 COM (1993) 700, final 
51 COM (1993) 700, final, p. 107 
52 COM (1993) 700, final, p. 24 & 83 
53 COM (1994) supplement 2/94 Bull. EU (The Bangemann report), p. 5-40 
54 The Bangemann report, p. 21-22 
55 COM (1994) 347, final 
56 COM (1994) 347, final, p. 5-6 
57 COM (1995) 382, final 
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market and is closely tied to the free movement of goods and services.58 It is important that 
the community is to be treated as one market in which to work. Therefore, rules concerning 
copyright and related rights should align from country to country. Otherwise, the internal 
market would become fragmented. According to the commission, the fact that in the 
information society works would increasingly more often be circulated in non-material form 
only further solidifies the insufficiency of national, territorial copyright solutions. Thus, the 
commission deemed it necessary to harmonize legislation on these matters on union level. 
On November 20th, 1996, the commission issued its follow-up to the Green Paper.59 In it, 
the commission reiterated the vitality of the single market for the development of the 
information society in Europe. Fragmented, inconsistent national responses to technological 
developments could have jeopardized its functioning. According to the commission, 
copyright and related rights play an important role in the information society, which called 
for legislative action in this field for the proper functioning of the single market. While 
Europe’s traditionally high level of copyright protection were to be maintained, there was a 
need to bring about a favorable environment which protects and stimulates creativity and 
innovative activities. Additionally, a fair balance of rights and interests between different 
stakeholders had to be ensured.60 
2.4 Information Society Directive 
2.4.1 Introduction 
EU copyright initiatives eventually culminated into the Directive on copyright and related 
rights in the Information Society – the Information Society Directive aka. the InfoSoc. 
Directive. The directive was considerably larger than the technological development 
required at the time, presumably as an attempt to make it future-proof.61 Although the 
directive particularly harmonized basic economic rights, the largest part of the directive deals 
with copyright exceptions and limitations. This is despite the fact that exceptions and 
limitations received little attention in the Green Papers prior the directive. 
As explained before, EU law exists within its own legal system outside of international law. 
One of the unique features of this legal system (and the interpretive methods it requires) is 
its cumulative reasoning in legal interpretation. Not only must focus be given to literal 
 
58 COM (1995) 382, final, p. 10 
59 COM (1996) 568, final 
60 COM (1996) 568, final, p. 2 
61 Rosati 2013, p. 18-20 
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interpretation, but the purpose and objectives of the legal framework in inhabits as well as 
the coherence of the entire legal system in general must be kept in mind. With that said, it is 
important to review the purpose and objectives of the InfoSoc. Directive concerning the 
directive as a whole as well as copyright exceptions and limitations – in particular, the 
quotation exception. This is done best by examining the appropriate recitals of the directive. 
Recitals 1-6 of the Commission’s proposal62 for the InfoSoc. Directive highlight the 
importance of harmonizing laws on copyright and related rights to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the internal market, to foster the development of the Information Society in 
Europe, to reduce legal uncertainty and fragmentation between member states and to respond 
to the economic realities associated with new technological development. This coincides 
with what was discussed in section 2.3 – the growing economic significance of copyright 
required union-level initiatives to ensure the functioning of the single market. In continental 
European tradition, the commission insists that the harmonization efforts must be based on 
a high level of protection to cultivate intellectual creation (recital 8). It was in their report 
concerning the proposal that the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights suggested 
an amendment underlining compliance with the fundamental principles of law, such as 
freedom of expression and the public interest.63 All of these recitals – in some form or 
another – made their way to the final draft of the directive and can be seen as constructing 
the foundational basis of the directive out of which its purpose and objectives are to be 
derived from. 
2.4.2 Exceptions and Limitations – The Quotation Exception 
The recitals concerning exceptions and limitations in particular are recitals 14 and 31-45 of 
the directive. Many of these recitals are rather specific and restricted to certain situations. 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is reasonable only to focus on a certain amount of them. 
Recital 31 begins with demanding that a fair balance of rights and interests between the 
different categories of rightholders and users of protected subject-matter must be 
safeguarded – a statement that can be viewed as forming the nucleus of the telos of 
exceptions and limitations. It is indeed through this balancing exercise that the CJEU often 
interprets and defines the scope of limitations and exceptions, sometimes even resulting in 
creating legal norms.64 This is discussed further in sections 2.5-2.6. Furthermore, recital 31 
 
62 COM (1997) 628, final  
63 A4 (1999) 26, p. 4 
64 Jongsma 2019, p. 15-16 
20 
 
calls for reassessment of the existing limitations and exceptions in the ’’new electronic 
environment’’ and highlights the problematic nature of differences in the exceptions and 
limitations to certain restricted acts for a functioning single market. The recital closes with 
stating that both the justification and the degree of harmonization of exceptions and 
limitations should be based on their impact on the smooth functioning of the internal market. 
That last line is especially interesting as it is the first hint towards the extent that the EU is 
willing to harmonize provisions on copyright exceptions and limitations. 
In recital 32, it is explained that the list of exceptions and limitations to the reproduction 
right and the right of communication to the public provided by the directive is exhaustive. 
This implies that the member states aren’t allowed to introduce exceptions and limitations 
to these exclusive rights beyond the ones provided by the directive – an issue that is discussed 
further in section 2.6.3. Recital 32 ensures, however, that the list provided takes into account 
different legal traditions within the union while also aiming to ensure a functioning single 
market. Still, the tension between harmonization and respecting legal traditions of the 
member states is obvious and can also partly explain the different viewpoints that European 
legal scholars have of the legal reasoning of the CJEU65. A type of a list concerning 
exceptions and limitations is provided in recital 34, although it doesn’t appear to be the finite 
list recital 32 was referring to. Rather, it gives the impression of a guideline provision for a 
set of exceptions and limitations that the member states should be given the option of 
providing for. It still warrants a mention as it is the only recital that mentions the quotation 
exception – as one of the items on the list. However, the quotation exception isn’t elaborated 
on beyond mentioning it by name. Therefore, recital 34 isn’t likely of particular interest in 
terms of interpreting the quotation exception.  
Finally, recital 44 demands that, when applying the exceptions and limitations provided by 
the InfoSoc. Directive, they should be exercised in accordance with international obligations. 
Application of exceptions and limitations must not prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightholder or conflict with the normal exploitation of his work or other subject-matter – 
expressions echoing the three-step-test provision of Berne, TRIPS and the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty. Additionally, according to the recital, the exceptions and limitations should reflect 
the increased economic impact that they may have in the context of the new electronic 
 
65 See Bobek ELR 2014, p. 1-4 & 7-10 
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environment. Therefore, it is explained, the scope of the exceptions and limitations may have 
to be even more limited when it comes to certain new uses of copyright and subject-matter. 
Recital 44 seems to underline a reserved approach that ought to be taken when faced with 
new technological development. It is reasonable to interpret that the ’’increased economic 
impact’’ refers to one aimed at the author’s or the rightholder’s legitimate interests as it is 
introduced right after the three-step-test guideline. The recital also places exceptions and 
limitations firmly in subordination to the three-step-test. Therefore, at the time of drafting 
the directive, it is clear that the provisions on exceptions and limitations – even the more 
open-ended ones – weren’t meant to be all-encompassing one-size-fit-all solutions. Rather, 
they were crafted with certain types of acts in mind with the knowledge that the wording of 
the provisions might, on a literal interpretation, result in some unforeseen consequences to 
copyright brought about by new technology. In that kind of a situation, the exceptions and 
limitations – such as the quotation exception – might have to be limited as not to interfere 
too much with the author’s or rightholder’s legitimate interests. This in turn shines some 
clarity on evaluating the scope of the quotation exception. 
In conclusion, although the recitals of the InfoSoc. Directive have little to say about the 
content of the quotation exception itself, there are several recitals explaining the telos of 
exceptions and limitations in addition to that of the directive as a whole. This in turn helps 
in outlining the boundaries and the scope of individual provisions. The quotation exception 
– like all exceptions and limitations – exists to strike a fair balance between the rights and 
interests of the rightholders and the users of protected subject-matter. It serves the public 
interest and ought to be harmonized insofar as to ensure the smooth functioning of the 
internal market. Still, using the quotation exception must not prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rightholders and conflict with normal exploitation of the work or other 
subject-matter. In other words, when determining the scope of the quotation exception, the 
smooth functioning of the internal market is an expansive factor while the legitimate interests 
of the rightholders are restrictive factors. 
2.5 The CJEU as the Interpreter of EU Law 
In order to interpret EU copyright legislation appropriately, it is advisable to elaborate on 
how EU law is generally interpreted. EU law doesn’t contain general rules on interpretation 
similar to many international legal texts, such as article 1:106 of Principles of European 
22 
 
Contract Law66 (PECL) and articles 31-33 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties67 
(VCLT). To be specific, EU law doesn’t have rules on how legal text should be interpreted 
and what meanings different terms should be given. EU is also not a signatory of VCLT and 
its relationship to international law is somewhat complex.68 In fact, the only rule in the 
foundational EU treaties regarding interpretation is in article 19 of EUT. According to it, it 
is the responsibility of the CJEU to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the 
foundational treaties (EUT & TFEU) the law is observed. Furthermore, the CJEU shall, at 
the request of courts and tribunals of the Member States, give preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation of EU law. More plainly, according to the official website of the EU, the role 
of the CJEU is to ensure that EU law is interpreted and applied the same way in every EU 
country69. 
As discussed earlier, the CJEU considers EU law to exist within its own autonomous legal 
system, separate from international law in general.70 This stance was also outlined in Van 
Gend en Loos, where the CJEU concluded that the Union (the Community at the time) 
constitutes its own legal order.71 Regardless, although the EU is not a signatory of VCLT, 
the CJEU has found that its principles can be applied to the EU to the extent that they 
represent customary EU law.72 Mainly EU does this to interpret international agreements to 
which the EU is a party (it is important to note the influence of Berne, TRIPS and WIPO 
Copyright Treaty on EU copyright framework). Indeed, one of the ways in which CJEU has 
applied the VCLT is through treaty interpretation. According to VCLT article 31(1), a treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
This is not a far cry from how the CJEU itself interprets EU law. In Van Gend en Loos, the 
CJEU already referred to ’’the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the EEC treaty’’ 
as a basis for its judgment.73 This echoes what was already brought up in section 1.3, the 
importance of systemic and teleological interpretation in EU law (among wording). It is not 
sufficient to simply focus on the telos of a particular legal provision, but rather the 
 
66 The Principles of European Contract Law 2002, (Parts I, II revised 1998, part III 2002), European Union 
67 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with annex), 23rd of May 1969, in force 27th of January 1980 
68 Odermatt 2019, p. 7-9 & p. 20 
69 European Union 2020, section Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
70 C-6/64 Costa ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, p. 593 
71 C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, p. 12 
72 Odermatt 2019, p. 20 
73 C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, p. 12-13 
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’’constitutional telos’’ of the EU legal order in whole.74 In light of TFEU article 26 and cases 
such as Deutsche Grammophon and Coditel, it is clear that ensuring the functioning of the 
single market is a key component of this constitutional telos (see section 2.3). This must be 
kept in mind when interpreting the quotation exception. 
The VCLT prioritizes the objective, literal meaning of the word over the subjective meaning 
that may be found in preparatory works and emphasize the latter only in situations when the 
objective meaning is left ambiguous or obscure (article 31-32). As mentioned above, this is 
roughly how the CJEU also interprets EU law, with a slight difference. In a teleological 
approach, it is not sufficient to simply focus on the telos of the rules, but the telos of the legal 
context in which those rules exist.75 Arguments based on subjective intention of the legislator 
aren’t commonly found in CJEU case law. In the absence of any further clarification on the 
telos of the quotation exception, the interpretive boundaries are to be found, in addition to 
the telos of the InfoSoc. Directive, in the telos of the EU legal system (in other words, in the 
articles of EUT and TFEU). This ’’meta-teleological’’ approach has often been interpreted 
to mean that the CJEU, if asked to interpret EU law, is likely to adopt a pro-integrationist 
solution in favor of an anti-integrationist one.76 The most controversial examples of this 
meta-teleological interpretation are cases such as Mangold77, Sturgeon78 and Pringle79 where 
the CJEU arguably tested the boundaries of teleological approach beside the written law and, 
according to the most fierce critics, even ruled contra legem, against written EU law. Though 
extreme cases like these are undoubtably rare, both the defenders and critics of CJEU legal 
reasoning mostly agree that this cumulative reasoning is what the court utilizes to interpret 
EU law. 
2.6 Exceptions and Limitations in EU Copyright Law – Safeguarding Fundamental 
Rights 
2.6.1 Autonomous Concepts of the EU 
There is no doubt that most copyright exceptions and limitations are autonomous concepts 
of the EU. What this means is that member states have the option to either implement or not 
to implement the optional provisions of the InfoSoc. Directive to their legislation. They do 
 
74 Maduro EJLS 2007, p. 140 
75 Maduro EJLS 2007, p. 140 
76 See. Bobek ELR 2014, p. 4-12 
77 C-144/04 Mangold ECLI:EU:C:2005:709. See also Wiesbrock MJECL 2011, p. 201-218 
78 Joined cases C-402/07 and C-432/07 Sturgeon & Others ECLI:EU:C:2009:716. See also AG Sharpston on 
Sturgeon & Others. 
79 C-370/12 Pringle ECLI:EU:C:2012:756. See also Graig MJECL 2013, p. 215-220 
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not, however, have the authority to determine the content of these provisions – that authority 
lies with the CJEU. This is evident due to a series of CJEU rulings on the topic and is the 
conclusion reached by many legal experts.80 
In Padawan, the CJEU ruled that, when a provision makes no reference to national law in 
regards to a concept provided therein, the terms in question must be given an independent 
and uniform interpretation throughout the Union.81 This conclusion was reached on the basis 
of earlier, settled case law.82 In Padawan, the concept of ’’fair compensation’’ in a provision 
of the InfoSoc. Directive made no reference to national law, leading the CJEU to conclude 
that ’’fair compensation’’ is an autonomous concept of the EU and requires uniform 
interpretation. To support this interpretation, the CJEU referred to the aims of the directive 
– namely, recital 32 and the need to ensure the functioning of the internal market through 
uniform interpretation of the provision.83 This called for ’’elaboration of autonomous 
concepts of European Union law’’ because an interpretation according to which member 
states would be free to determine the limits in an inconsistent and unharmonized manner 
would be contrary to the objective of the InfoSoc. Directive. Much for the same reasons, the 
CJEU concluded, In DR & TV2 Danmark, that the expression ’’by means of its own 
facilities’’ is an autonomous EU concept due to the provision not making any reference to 
national law84. 
More plainly, the CJEU ruled in ACI Adam (regarding private use) that member states have 
the option to introduce the different exceptions provided for in article 5 of the InfoSoc. 
Directive but they ’’must be applied coherently’’ should they make the choice to introduce 
the provisions.85 This is necessary, according to the CJEU, to achieve the objective of the 
InfoSoc. Directive and to ensure the functioning of the internal market as allowing the 
member states to define the scope of the exceptions unharmoniously would be counter to 
these objectives. At the same time, the CJEU noted that the member states are free to 
introduce the different exceptions provided for in article 5 ’’in accordance with their legal 
traditions’’ – a statement that could be seen as an odd fit to the court’s overall conclusion. If 
 
80 See f.ex. Jongsma 2019, p. 203-204 and European Copyright Society 2014, p. 5.  
81 C-467/08 Padawan ECLI:EU:C:2010:620, para 32 
82 See f.ex. C-327/82 Ekro ECLI:EU:C:1984:11, para 11 and Case C-287/98 Linster ECLI:EU:C:2000:468, 
para 43 
83 C-467/08 Padawan ECLI:EU:C:2010:620, paras 33-37. See also C-479/04 Laserdisken 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:549, para 33, where the CJEU concluded that legislative actions on a national level 
concerning copyright and the related rights might cause distortion to the functioning of the internal market. 
84 C-510/10 DR and TV2 Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2012:244, paras 33-34 
85 C-435/12 ACI Adam ECLI:EU:C:2014:254, paras 34-35 
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the member states’ independent discretion truly consists entirely of the decision to either 
implement the provisions or not it is rather difficult to see the influence that different legal 
traditions might have in this process. On the other hand, the CJEU seems to imply that the 
list of exceptions and limitations in article 5 were created with taking different legal 
traditions of the member states into account, citing recital 32 of the InfoSoc. Directive. In 
other words, the provisions are in accordance with the legal traditions of the member states 
as they are. Although the legal reasoning of the CJEU can be a controversial topic among 
legal commentators, this rationale of a harmony between different legal traditions and EU 
jurisprudence isn’t unheard of in judicial literature either86. 
2.6.2 Deckmyn – Exceptions and Limitations Receive Uniform Interpretation 
Insofar as copyright exceptions and limitations are concerned, perhaps no other ruling in 
recent years has been more influential than Deckmyn87. In that case, the CJEU interpreted 
the parody exception in article 5(3)(k) of the InfoSoc. Directive. The Brussels Court of 
Appeals asked the CJEU if ’’parody’’ is an autonomous concept of the EU and, if so, what 
kind of conditions must be met in order for a work to be considered a parody. Citing 
Padawan and ACI Adam, the CJEU confirmed that ’’parody’’ indeed must be regarded as 
an autonomous concept of the EU due to article 5(3)(k) not making any reference to national 
law. In the absence of any definition of parody in the directive, the CJEU argued that the 
term’s meaning should be determined by considering its usual meaning in everyday 
language, while also taking into account the context in which it occurs and the purposes of 
the rules of which it is part. This argumentation echoes the CJEU’s cumulative legal 
interpretation that was discussed above in section 2.5. 
There are several key arguments in the Deckmyn ruling that should be pointed out. Although 
the court concurred the Advocate General’s view of what is the everyday meaning of 
’’parody’’ – that is to say, a work, that 1) evokes an existing work while being noticeably 
different from it and 2) constitutes an expression of humor or mockery – it rejected the 
conditions proposed by the Brussels Court of Appeals as possible requirements for a work 
to be considered parody.88 The CJEU concluded that the conditions proposed by the Brussels 
Court of Appeals (such as the requirement of displaying an original character of its own and 
mentioning the source of the work) do not follow from the ordinary, everyday meaning of 
 
86 See f.ex. Nicola AJCL 2016, p. 865-890 
87 C-201/13 Deckmyn ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132. See especially paras 14-17 & 19 
88 C-201/13 Deckmyn ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, paras 20-24 
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’’parody’’ nor from the context of the provision. Therefore, the court argued, the provision 
must be interpreted strictly in order to enable its effectiveness. 
Deckmyn also reaffirmed the relationship between fundamental rights and copyright 
exceptions and limitations. Citing recital 3 of the InfoSoc. Directive, the court argued that 
the InfoSoc. Directive aims to implement the four freedoms of the internal market and which 
relates to observance of the fundamental principles of law and especially of property, 
including intellectual property, and freedom of expression and the public interest. The CJEU 
pointed out that parody is an appropriate way of expressing an opinion, indicating a link 
between parody and freedom of expression. Adding to this, the court also pointed out that 
article 5 of the InfoSoc. Directive seeks to fulfill the objectives laid out in recital 31 – to 
strike a fair balance between the rights and interests of different rightholders. In particular, 
a fair balance between the rights and interests of the author and the user of the work must be 
struck in a case-by-case analysis.89 
Lastly, there was a remark in Deckmyn that proved to be somewhat controversial. The CJEU 
had granted to Vandersteen and others that the ’’discriminatory message’’ conveyed by the 
parody drawing in question is something that they have a legitimate interest in not having 
associated with the protected work. Thus, it would be a legitimate interest of the author or 
the rightholder that should be taken into account in the balancing exercise. In doing so, the 
court seemed to venture to the realms of moral rights even though they had been explicitly 
left outside the scope of harmonization. It is then questionable whether the CJEU should 
take the moral rights into account in its harmonization efforts. Not only that, the court 
appeared to recognize interests that do not have a particular basis in European law as these 
legitimate interests belong not only to the author, but also to any ’’holders of rights’’. 
Although moral rights themselves aren’t uncommon in European legal systems, they 
typically aren’t granted to the successors of the author, but rather the author alone. Thus, this 
conclusion has raised criticism about ambiguity and opening the possibility of private 
censorship as well as whether copyright law is the right place to evaluate these kinds of 
questions.90 
After Deckmyn, the question arose: what is left for national courts’ discretion on parody? 
There have been comments made that if member states are free to choose whether to 
 
89 C-201/13 Deckmyn ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, paras 25-28 
90 C-201/13 Deckmyn ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132, paras 29-31. See Jongsma 2019, p. 132-133 & 192-193 and 
Jongsma IRIPCL 2017, p. 665-666. See also European Copyright Society 2014, p. 7. 
27 
 
implement the optional provisions or not, they must also be allowed to introduce the 
provisions with a narrower scope.91 Although this kind of reasoning is not without its merits, 
it would be an odd conclusion to reach when one takes into account that the CJEU explicitly 
rejected the conditions proposed by the Brussels Court of Appeals. In no uncertain terms, 
the CJEU denied that limitations & exceptions should be transposed restrictively in national 
law.92 This is evident by the court’s reasoning in not only Deckmyn, but in TV2 Danmark, 
Padawan and ACI Adam as well. The court reasoned that an unharmonized application of 
the limits of the exceptions could potentially cause inconsistencies and would run contrary 
to the directive’s objective of ensuring the functioning of the single market. It is then very 
unlikely that the CJEU would agree with member states introducing criteria not found in the 
InfoSoc. Directive for the exceptions93. 
The logical conclusion follows that the discretion allowed for the member states is to be 
found within the autonomous concept. Following the court’s two-fold definition of a parody, 
it is then left for the national courts to determine if 1) the work at hand is to be considered a 
parody at all and 2) is the parody lawful (striking a fair balance).94 The Advocate General, 
after reviewing the definitions of parody of multiple different legal systems, presented the 
court with a definition – that parody must evoke an existing work while being noticeably 
different from it and provoke an expression of humor or mockery.95 This first criteria is 
unlikely to disrupt national legal traditions on parody as this is very similar to how member 
states have defined parody from the beginning.96 However, it is through the interpretation of 
fair balance that might result in differences in points of view and can, at least to some extent, 
revive the national concepts of parody97. For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is not 
necessary to explore the concept of parody any further. Still, insofar as applicable, these 
arguments no doubt apply to exceptions and limitations in general – including the quotation 
exception.  
2.6.3 An Exhaustive (and a Mandatory?) Set of Exceptions and Limitations 
In Spiegel Online, the referring court asked whether fundamental rights had an influence in 
the scope of the exceptions and limitations in article 5(3) and whether fundamental rights 
 
91 Jongsma IRIPCL 2017, p. 670. Also see, regarding quotation, see AG Trstenjak on Painer, para 190. 
92 European Copyright Society 2014, p. 5 
93 Jongsma IRIPCL 2017, p. 670-671 
94 Jongsma IRIPCL 2017, p. 671-673 and Seville NLSIR 2015, p. 12-14 
95 AG Cruz Villalón on Deckmyn, para 89 
96 Jongsma IRIPCL 2017, p. 655-656 & 664-665 
97 Jongsma IRIPCL 2017, p. 673-679. 
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can justify exceptions and limitations beyond those provided in article 5(3). These 
fundamental rights are enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (CFR).98 It should be noted that nearly identical questions were referred by the very 
same court in Funke Medien99 a.k.a Afghanistan Papers, as pointed out by Advocate General 
(AG) Szpunar.100 The CJEU decided to answer the latter question first. 
Szpunar concluded that freedom of expression and media do not justify a limitation or 
exception beyond those provided in articles 5(2) and 5(3).101 The CJEU agreed, beginning 
its reasoning by referencing the telos of the directive, found in the recitals and the preparatory 
works.102 The Explanatory Memorandum to Proposal of the InfoSoc. Directive describes the 
exceptions and limitations in the directive exhaustive.103 The same is evident from recital 32 
of the directive. According to the court, it follows from recitals 3 and 31 that the 
harmonization aims to safeguard, in particular in the electronic environment, a fair balance 
between different rightholders’ interests.104 The court also stated that this balancing 
mechanism is contained withing the InfoSoc. Directive with the author’s exclusive rights 
(articles 2-4) and the exceptions and limitations (article 5).105 Interestingly, the court hinted 
towards these exceptions and limitations being possibly mandatory as they represent 
fundamental rights that the member states must respect. This is slightly peculiar as the 
provision are worded in a manner that they are optional. Still, this approach is seemingly 
understandable from a fundamental rights point of view.106 
Just like the court, AG Szpunar also stated that the exceptions and limitations provided in 
article 5(3) of the InfoSoc. Directive are already a product of weighing fundamental rights 
against each other (author’s exclusive rights vs freedom of expression) and the legislative 
choices in this regard should generally be respected. Furthermore, according to Szpunar, 
allowing the introduction of exceptions and limitations beyond those in article 5(3) on 
grounds of argumentation based on fundamental rights would be tantamount to introducing 
into EU law ’’a kind of fair use clause’’ which would interfere with the effects of the 
 
98 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391-407) 
99 C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW (Afghanistan Papers) ECLI:EU:C:2019:623 
100 AG Szpunar on Spiegel Online, para 61 
101 AG Szpunar on Spiegel Online, para 81. The last line should be noted: ’’This is also the case in the situation 
where the author of the work in question holds public office and that work discloses his beliefs on matters of 
public interest, in so far as that work is already available to the public.’’ 
102 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, paras 41-42 
103 COM (1997) 628, final, recital 22 
104 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, para 42 
105 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, para 43 
106 The Court answered similarly in C-469/17 Afghanistan Papers ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, para 56-58 
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directive and its harmonization goals. As a result, Szpunar argued, the protection enjoyed by 
the author would ultimately depend on how sensitive the national courts are to freedom of 
expression, which would be very counterproductive to harmonization efforts.107 
The fundamental rights, according to the court, draw inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions common to the member states and international instruments for the protection of 
human rights.108 In relation to that, the court stated that articles 5(3)(c-d) (in other words, 
reproduction by press and the quotation exception) are specifically aimed to favor freedom 
of expression and the press over the interests of the author – something that the court had, to 
some extent at least, established before in Painer.109 A fair balance between fundamental 
rights is to be struck in particular between the right to intellectual property (article 17(2) of 
CFR) and freedom of expression and information (article 11 of CFR). The CJEU added that 
article 5(5) of the InfoSoc. Directive – the three-step-test – also serves to strike this fair 
balance as an additional requirement to articles 5(1-4).110 Thus, the court took the stand that 
the three-step-test should be regarded as an additional provision on top of the previous ones 
on exceptions and limitations.111 
Similarly to AG Szpunar, the CJEU found it troublesome for harmonization purposes and 
legal certainty to allow member states to move beyond the exhaustive list of exceptions and 
limitations listed in article 5.112 After all, recital 31 of the InfoSoc. Directive explicitly states 
that the existing differences in exceptions and limitations had direct negative effects to the 
functioning of the internal market – a problem that the harmonization process attempts to 
overcome. It also follows from recital 32 that these exceptions and limitations should be 
applied consistently, as no provision in the directive envisages the possibility of the member 
states to extend their scope at their own accord.113 
AG Szpunar added that the author’s enjoyment of copyright isn’t conditional upon actual 
exploitation of the work by its author. Rather, the author also has the right to prevent 
exploitation of his work by third parties if said exploitation isn’t authorized by the author. 
Interestingly, Szpunar also made a point about moral rights. He said that, although being left 
 
107 AG Szpunar on Spiegel Online, paras 61-63 
108 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, para 44 and the case law therein 
109 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, para 45 and C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, para 
135 
110 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, para 46 
111 See also C-469/17 Afghanistan Papers ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paras 59-61 
112 This is something that the CJEU has, regarding communication to the public (article 3(1)), established before 
in C-466/12 Svensson and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:76, paras 34-35 
113 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, paras 47-49 and the case law therein 
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outside of InfoSoc. Directive’s scope of harmonization, moral rights must be taken into 
account when interpreting its provisions. This is because the InfoSoc. Directive only 
constitutes a partial harmonization of copyright. When transposed to the copyright law of 
the member states, its provisions necessarily interact with other provision of that law, 
including those concerning moral rights. Therefore, although the InfoSoc. Directive is only 
meant to harmonize copyright law on certain fields, this cannot be used as a justification to 
disregard moral rights. This may bring some clarity to the relationship of moral rights and 
the InfoSoc. Directive especially since the CJEU’s reasoning in Deckmyn did raise some 
concerns on this front.114 AG Szpunar, at least, seems to imply that the directive merely 
recognizes the existence of moral rights and asserts their validity in copyright law while 





114 See f.ex. Jongsma IRIPC 2017, p. 665-666 and the citations therein and European Copyright Society 2014, 
p. 7. ECS referred to ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) article 10(2): ’’any limitation to the 
right to freedom of expression can only be justified if it is “prescribed by law and [is] necessary in a democratic 
society’’ 
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3. THE QUOTATION EXCEPTION 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section, the thesis analyzes the quotation exception in great detail. Now that the 
objectives and the purpose of the EU, the InfoSoc. Directive as well as exceptions and 
limitations have been sufficiently explained, the content of the quotation exception can be 
explored in-depth and in a multifaceted way. This section examines ’’quotation’’ as an 
autonomous concept of EU law as well as breaks down each of the conditions and 
expressions in article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive. After this, the thesis is able to present 
a complete and a multilayered picture of the quotation exception, providing an answer to the 
first research question and setting up the groundwork for the second question. 
The origin of the quotation exception – at least, in regard to EU law – is in the Berne 
Convention. As explained before, due to the EU being a member of TRIPS, it is obligated to 
follow articles 1-21 of Berne. Berne includes provisions for exceptions and limitations in 
articles 9(2), 10 and 10bis. Article 10(1) reads as follows: 
’’It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been 
lawfully made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with 
fair practice, and their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including 
quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries..’’ 
As can be seen from the wording of the provision, there are several conditions included in 
the quotation exception. Interestingly enough, the imperative ’’shall’’ implies that the 
quotation exception is mandatory. In fact, although most of the exceptions and limitations in 
Berne are ultimately left to the legislators of the contracting states to permit, the quotation 
exception is the only copyright exception that the Convention requires for the contracting 
states to adopt. This interpretation is indicated not only by the wording of the provision, but 
also by judicial literature.116 Next, this is compared to how the EU has incorporated the 
quotation exception in its own copyright law. 
3.2 The Quotation Exception in the InfoSoc. Directive 
EU copyright directives typically make little reference to the laws of the member states when 
it comes to determining the meaning and the scope of the terms therein. This is also true for 
article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive – the quotation exception. Due to established case 
 
116 See Goldstein – Hugenholtz 2010, p. 41 and Bently – Aplin 2018, p. 3-5. This interpretation is further 
supported by the fact that the language Berne reserves for other exceptions and limitations is very different. 
See f.ex. articles 10(2) and 10bis, where the wording reads: ’’it shall be a matter for legislation in the countries 
of the Union to permit/determine…’’ (underlines added). 
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law, this means that these terms are autonomous concepts of EU law and must be given 
uniform and independent interpretation throughout the union. Indeed, this rule has caused 
many key concepts of copyright to turn into autonomous concepts of the EU.117 Although 
the CJEU has not explicitly stated so, this has arguably happened to the quotation exception 
as well118. Bearing that in mind, it is time to inspect the quotation exception. Article 5(3)(d) 
of the InfoSoc. Directive reads as follows:  
’’Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for 
in Articles 2 and 3 in the following cases:… 
d) quotations for purposes such as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a 
work or other subject-matter which has already been lawfully made available to the 
public, that, unless this turns out to be impossible, the source, including the author's 
name, is indicated, and that their use is in accordance with fair practice, and to the 
extent required by the specific purpose.’’ 
Article 5(3)(d) closely resembles articles 10(1) and 10(3)119 of Berne. Much like its sister-
provision in the Berne Convention, the quotation exception in the InfoSoc. Directive restricts 
the right of quotation to works or other subject-matter which have already been lawfully 
made available to the public. Additionally, both provisions require that the use is in 
accordance with fair practice and to the extent required by the specific purpose. It is also 
necessary to, when possible, indicate the source of the work, including the author’s name. 
In a stark contrast to Berne, the InfoSoc. Directive doesn’t describe the quotation exception 
as mandatory. It is an exception that the member states may provide. This is a peculiar choice 
of words as the EU is obligated to comply with article 10(1) of Berne. As mentioned earlier, 
the wording used in Berne leaves little doubt that the quotation exception is intended to be 
mandatory. It is then difficult to see article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive as anything else 
but an erroneous implementation of the Berne Convention in this regard. 
What is also noteworthy is that, in article 5(3)(d), the possible purposes of use are laid out 
in the beginning of the provision whereas in Berne 10(1), they are left to the very end. This 
might be an intentional decision as article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive exists to preclude 
the exclusive right of reproduction conferred on authors from preventing the publication of 
 
117 Jongsma 2019, p. 23-24 
118 AG Szpunar, in his opinion on Metall Auf Metall, suggested as much by claiming that it ’’must be true’’ 
that quotation is an autonomous concept of the EU. See AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 76 and the 
cases therein 
119 Article 10(3) of Berne: ’’Where use is made of works in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of [article 
10], mention shall be made of the source, and of the name of the author if it appears thereon’’. Berne had a 
separate provision for the requirement of mentioning the source and the name of the author, while the InfoSoc. 
Directive incorporated this requirement into article 5(3)(d). 
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quotations (accompanied by comments or criticism) of works already made lawfully 
available to the public – as explained by the CJEU in Painer120. The provision therefore 
functions to guarantee the users’ freedom of expression over the interests of the author in 
being able to prevent reproduction of extracts of his work, especially in situations where the 
author might be reluctant to do so. This balancing exercise is in the core of article 5(3)(d) of 
the InfoSoc. Directive and is often repeated by the CJEU, as shall be seen later. 
The quotation exception in the InfoSoc. Directive is further influenced by article 5(5). This 
article implements the three-step-test into EU copyright legislation and is very similar to 
Berne’s article 9(2) and TRIPS’s article 13. The wording indicates that the quotation 
exception should be subjugated to the three-step-test. Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc. Directive 
reads as follows: 
’’The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be 
applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the rightholder.’’ 
This would make the quotation exception very conditional as article 5(3)(d) itself includes 
certain conditions. Added together, this would mean that the member states may provide for 
a quotation exception related to works or other subject-matter, provided that 1) the work or 
subject-matter has already been lawfully made available to the public, 2) the source, 
including the author’s name, is indicated (unless impossible), 3) the use is in accordance 
with fair practice, 4) the use is done to the extent required by the specific purpose, 5) it is 
only applied in certain special cases, 6) it doesn’t conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work or other subject-matter and 7) it doesn’t unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the rightholder. A literal interpretation results in seven different conditions that should all 
be met for a use to be considered a quotation, a valid exception to copyright under EU law. 
These requirements, however, shall be analyzed further on. 
None of the preparatory works of the InfoSoc. Directive describe the quotation exception 
much further than it is already laid out in article 5(3)(d). This may not have been necessary 
as, considering the nature of directives, the legislative means to define ’’quotation’’ may 
have been left to the member states.121 Even then, the CJEU has been somewhat reluctant to 
 
120 C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, paras 119-120 
121 This could also explain why the CJEU, in Painer, abstained from ruling on the correctness of the assumption 
that photographic works are covered by article 5(3)(d) while still making a ruling on a referred question that 
was crafted on that assumption. See C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, paras 122-123 
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utilize preparatory works to interpret EU legal provisions in the past. Therefore, if one were 
to discover the legislator’s subjective perception of quotation, it might not be of any 
interpretive significance (although this might be due to change as preparatory work is 
becoming more available).122 
3.3 The Meaning of Quotation 
3.3.1 The Definition of Quotation 
It is evident that the quotation exception provision is open-ended. According to article 
5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive, member states may provide for a quotation exception for 
’’purposes such as criticism and review’’. Although the three-step-test requires that the 
exceptions and limitations are only to be applied in certain special cases, this did not result 
in crafting an exhaustive list for possible uses of quotation in EU law. Aside from the 
conditions (although numerous) highlighted before, the scope of the exception is merely 
defined by what is meant by certain terms in the provision, one of them being ’’quotation’’ 
itself. 
A precise definition of ’’quotation’’ is nowhere to be found in the InfoSoc. Directive. Such 
a definition isn’t found in the Berne Convention either. For the longest time, it seems that 
the definition of quotation had been solely left to the discretion of the member states. 
However, on 29th of July, 2019, the CJEU gave two rulings where this seems to have 
changed. In Metall Auf Metall123 and Spiegel Online124, the court stated the following: 
’’As regards the usual meaning of the word ‘quotation’ in everyday language, it 
should be noted that the essential characteristics of a quotation are the use, by a user 
other than the copyright holder, of a work or, more generally, of an extract from a 
work for the purposes of illustrating an assertion, of defending an opinion or of 
allowing an intellectual comparison between that work and the assertions of that 
user.’’ (Boldening and underlining added) 
After these rulings, it is fair to conclude that the CJEU has provided for a rough definition 
of quotation for EU copyright law. The underlined section of the paragraph above appears 
to display the meaning of the term ’’quotation’’ as it appears in EU copyright law. It seems 
to cover all of AG Szpunar’s proposed characteristics for a quotation, as presented by him 
in his opinion on Metall Auf Metall.125 It should be noted that, in Spiegel Online, the court 
 
122 Odermatt 2019, p. 20-21 
123 C-476/17 Metall Auf Metall ECLI:EU:C:2019:624, para 71 
124 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, para 78 
125 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, paras 62-68 
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also added that, whether the quotation is made as part of a work protected by copyright or, 
on the other hand, as part of subject-matter not protected by copyright, is irrelevant126. 
Quotation is defined as a use of a work or of an extract from a work. This sentence has a few 
implications. First, it doesn’t discriminate between different types of works – implying that 
it covers various types of works. Second, it presents the ’’use of a work’’ or of ’’an extract 
from a work’’ as equally valid options for the purposes of quoting. It would suggest that 
quoting works in their entirety can be justified. On top of this, however, the court stated that 
a quotation is used for purposes of illustrating an assertion, of defending an opinion or of 
allowing an intellectual comparison between that work and the assertions of that user. This 
sentence is interesting in its apparent exclusivity. It almost presents itself as a finite list of 
valid purposes for quotation. There are no expressions that would signal towards an open-
ended guideline (’’for example’’ or ’’such as’’ would be common examples of this). As 
such, it is noticeably different from the ’’purposes’’ clause in article 5(3)(d). 
3.3.2 Use of a Work 
’’Quotation’’ no doubt covers quoting literary works and works of similar nature – in other 
words, a quotation of text. It is reasonable to consider this the ordinary, traditional meaning 
of quotation. In fact, when contemplating on the meaning of quotation, both AG Trstenjak 
and AG Szpunar have stated as much: 
 ’’The exception for quotations is one of the most traditional exceptions to copyright. 
It has long been regarded as applying only to literary works. In works of this type, 
quotations are traditionally signaled by typographical means: inverted commas, 
italics, a different typeface from that of the main text, footnotes and so on’’127 
’’ According to its traditional meaning, a quotation is generally only a partial extract 
of a text’’128 
’’The quotation exception has its origin and is mainly used in literary works’’129 
Not only is this likely the perception that the general public has of ’’quotation’’, it could be 
argued to coincide with article 10(1) of Berne.130 While article 10(1) of Berne is open-ended, 
the provision only lists textual quotations as possible examples of quotation. This would 
allude to quotation of text being the primary meaning of quotation. This way, although Berne 
article 10(1) doesn’t discriminate between different types of works, one could argue that it 
 
126 This was established in C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, para 136 
127 AG Szpunar on Spiegel Online, para 41 
128 AG Trstenjak on Painer, para 212 
129 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 62 
130 AG Szpunar had also referred to Berne 10(1) to support his perception of the traditional meaning of 
quotation in his opinion on Spiegel Online. See AG Szpunar on Spiegel Online, cit. 17 
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would not have been necessary to do so. The meaning of quotation as a textual quotation 
would’ve limited the exception’s coverage sufficiently to certain kinds of acts and works. 
Interestingly, article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive is worded in more general terms. As 
possible uses of the quotation exception, the provision lists ’’purposes such as criticism and 
review’’. It could be argued that this kind of wording doesn’t imply to any specific form of 
quotation, unlike Berne’s article 10(1). 
One could reasonably object that the CJEU has, in the past, ruled that the provisions of a 
directive which derogate from ’’a general principle’’ established by that directive must be 
interpreted strictly.131 In Infopaq, the CJEU plainly stated that the requirement of 
authorization from the rightholder for any reproduction of a protected work is the general 
principle established by the InfoSoc. Directive. Exceptions and limitations to this general 
principle, therefore, are exemptions that require strict interpretation.132 It could’ve been 
tempting to then conclude that literary works are the extent of the works that the quotation 
exception can be applied to. 
But, as it turns out, this is certainly not the case for the quotation exception. As mentioned 
before, article 10(1) of Berne merely describes the exception as a quotation from ’’a work’’ 
– without further categorization to certain types of works. In article 2(1) of Berne, literary 
and artistic works are said to include ’’every production in the literary, scientific and artistic 
domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression’’. This is said to include a vast 
range of different types of works, such as books, dramatic works, musical works, 
choreographic works, cinematographic works, paintings, photographic works and so on. 
Although article 10(1) of Berne can be said to allude to quoting merely literary works, 
arguments have been made that the provision was meant to cover all types of works from 
the start. Lionel Bently and Tanya Aplin have argued that article 10(1) of Berne encompasses 
much of what is understood by the notion of ’’fair use’’133, a copyright exception doctrine 
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132 The provision in question, in Infopaq, was article 5(1) of the InfoSoc. Directive which deals with temporary 
reproductions. However, similar argumentation have been used in cases like C-435/12 ACI Adam 
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133 Title 17 U.S. Code (The Code of Law of the United States of America) § 107 – the Fair use doctrine – is a 
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judges can consider are the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 




utilized in US copyright law.134 They argue that, according to the wording of the Convention 
and the travaux preparatoires, the quotation exception applies to all types of works covered 
under the Convention and can have ordinary meaning outside quotations of text, such as 
quoting elements of artistic paintings and musical works. 
Although this is arguably a robust argument, Bently’s and Aplin’s analysis of article 10(1) 
of Berne might have been even stronger were it to have been presented on article 5(3)(d) of 
the InfoSoc. Directive. Due to its membership in the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, the EU is obligated to subscribe to the conception of ’’work’’ laid out in 
article 2(1) of Berne. Additionally, unlike article 10(1) of Berne, article 5(3)(d) of the 
InfoSoc. Directive makes no allusions to any specific categories of works whatsoever. 
Finally, as explained in section 2.5, EU provisions are interpreted by giving the terms their 
ordinary meaning while also considering the legislative context in which they occur as well 
as the coherence of the entire EU legal system – the telos and the meta-telos. As explained 
in sections 2.3-2.4, the InfoSoc. Directive was specifically created to harmonize laws on 
copyright and related rights to foster the development of the information society in Europe, 
to respond to the economic realities brought about by new technological development as 
well as to reassess the existing limitations and exceptions in the new electronic environment. 
Against this background, it could be argued that retaining the original, traditional meaning 
of quotation would have been very counterproductive. 
The CJEU had implied as early as in Painer that the quotation exception can be applied to 
photographic works.135 In that case, the court had agreed to answer the referred questions on 
the established assumption (by the parties involved) that photographic works are covered by 
article 5(3)(d) – albeit without ruling on the correctness of that assumption. This can be 
interpreted as the CJEU greenlighting the notion of applying the quotation exception on 
different types of works. It should be noted that AG Trstenjak, in his opinion on Painer, also 
appeared to tacitly approve the idea of applying the quotation exception on photographic 
works136. 
Later, the CJEU went further down this road. In his opinion on Metall Auf Metall, AG 
Szpunar stated that, although quotation has its origin and is mainly used in literary works, 
he sees no reason why, under EU copyright law, the quotation exception couldn’t be applied 
 
134 Bently – Aplin 2018, p. 1-8 & 18-21 
135 C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, paras 122-123 
136 AG Trstenjak on Painer para 212 
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to other categories of works, in particular, musical works.137 The CJEU confirmed AG 
Szpunar’s view that the exception can indeed be applied to musical works, strongly implying 
that it can be applied to all kinds of works.138 Furthermore, in his opinion on Spiegel Online, 
AG Szpunar claimed that, at the present time (in comparison to the origins of the word 
’’quotation’’), he didn’t see it inconceivable that the quotation exception could be applied to 
works such as musical works, cinematographic works and works of visual art.139 Although 
neither confirming or denying AG Szpunar’s assertion, the CJEU described the quotation 
exception as the use of ’’a work’’ or ’’of an extract from a work’’ without discriminating 
between different categories of works.140 The court, thus, seemed to assert its earlier 
interpretation of quotation as one extending outside its traditional meaning. There do not 
seem to be any arbitrary restrictions to the scope of the exception in terms of different 
categories of works. 
3.3.3 In Whole or in Part 
According to article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive, quotation is described as a use of a 
work or of an extract from a work. In other words, no specifications on the extent of a 
quotation are made. This raises the question whether quoting a work in its entirety can be 
justified under the provision. According to AG Szpunar, the academic legal opinion on this 
question is divided.141 Interestingly, in the Brussels Act of the Berne Convention (1948), 
article 10(1) permitted ’’short quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals’’. In the 
very next revision of the Convention, the Stockholm Act (1967), the word ’’short’’ had been 
removed. Instead, the provision only demanded that the quotation is compatible with ’’fair 
practice’’ and that its ’’extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose’’. It appears then 
that quoting a work in its entirety can also be permissible as long as the use meets these two 
conditions – a conclusion that AG Szpunar also arrived to. 
The CJEU also seems to agree that quoting a work in its entirety can sometimes be justified. 
AG Trstenjak had concluded that, although quotations have originally referred to partial 
extracts of texts, there are instances where a full quotation can also be in accordance with 
article 5(3)(d).142 He stated that, in the case of photos, ’’a complete reproduction may be 
 
137 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 62 
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139 AG Szpunar on Spiegel Online, para 42. 
140 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, paras 78-79 
141 AG Szpunar on Spiegel Online, para 45 and the citations therein 
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necessary in order to create the necessary material reference back to the work’’. This is 
understandable as, if article 5(3)(d) would only approve partial publications of photos, this 
would be very impractical and heavily restrict the provision’s applicability. He added that, 
in the case of a full quotation, ’’particular importance is attached to the other requirements’’, 
such as the requirement of fair practice and the examination of the three-step-test under 
Article 5(5) of the directive.143 As explained in section 3.3.2, the court answered the referred 
question on the assumption that the quotation exception can be applied to photos, although 
without ruling on the correctness of that assumption. 
Therefore, it seems that the CJEU has greenlighted the notion that full quotations can be 
permissible under article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive as long as all the other conditions 
of the provision are met. It could be, however, that this is more acceptable in the case of 
works where quoting only extracts or parts would be impractical or defeat the purpose of the 
quotation. Examples of these kinds of works are arguably photos, paintings and very short 
poems. 
3.4 The Dialogue Requirement 
3.4.1 A Dialogue between the Quoting Work and the Quoted Work 
The expression ’’for purposes such as criticism or review’’ in article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. 
Directive can arguably be easily overlooked as not of great significance. At first glance, this 
sentence only appears to be a non-exhaustive, open-ended guide describing possible 
purposes that a quotation can be used for. In reality, this expression contains an important 
qualification that a use has to meet in order to be considered a quotation within the meaning 
of the provision. This qualification is known as the dialogue requirement. 
Although not addressed by the court at the time, the dialogue requirement was hinted towards 
as early as in Painer or, rather, in AG Trstenjak’s opinion on the case. He provided several 
supplementary remarks on the quotation exception that weren’t specifically requested by the 
referring party as he deemed them potentially useful for the settlement of the main 
proceedings.144 AG Trstenjak stated that the expression ’’for purposes such as criticism or 
review’’ indicates that the reproduction has to take place for what he called ’’quotation 
purposes’’. He added that, in natural language usage, the work must be reproduced ’’without 
modification in identifiable form’’. Furthermore, he stated that there must be a ’’material 
 
143 AG Trstenjak on Painer, para 213 
144 AG Trstenjak on Painer, para 208 
40 
 
reference’’ back to the quoted work in the form of a description, commentary or analysis. 
Trstenjak explained that a quotation must be ’’a basis for discussion’’. Lastly, he stated that 
whether these conditions have been met must be decided through case-by-case analysis.145 
Although AG Trstenjak inferred these requirements out of the wording of article 5(3)(d), the 
CJEU itself didn’t address this notion at the time. 
It wasn’t until Metall Auf Metall that this topic was revisited. the Federal Court of Justice of 
Germany asked the CJEU if it could be said that a work or other subject-matter is used for 
quotation purposes if it’s not evident that a work or subject-matter of another person is being 
used. In that case, AG Szpunar stated that the expression ’’for purposes such as criticism and 
review’’, although not being an exhaustive list of quotation purposes, means that a quotation 
must enter into ’’some kind of dialogue’’ with the work quoted. He argued that this dialogue 
could be confrontational, a tribute or it could take place in any other way as long as there is 
interaction between the quoted work and the quoting work. According to Szpunar, artistic 
quotations, such as musical quotations, in particular, often do not take place for this kind of 
purpose but rather ’’pursue other objectives’’.146 
3.4.2 Unaltered and Distinguishable 
Furthermore, adding to the first point, Szpunar stated that a quotation must be ’’unaltered 
and distinguishable’’ from the quoting work. A quotation should be incorporated to the 
quoting work, without modification, in a manner that it can be distinguished ’’as a foreign 
element’’. This, Szpunar argued, is necessary in order to fill the first requirement as the 
quoting work cannot enter into a dialogue with the quoted work if the quotation is 
indistinguishable from the quoting work. In his opinion, these two conditions make a 
distinction between quotation and plagiarism.147 
The court itself had little to add to AG Szpunar’s stance on the matter. It confirmed that 
taking a sound sample from a musical work and incorporating it into a new work may indeed 
amount to a quotation within the meaning of the provision, provided that it meets all the 
requirements laid out by the definition of quotation and the wording of article 5(3)(d) – 
including the dialogue requirement.148 Furthermore, the court plainly stated that such 
 
145 AG Trstenjak on Painer, paras 209-211 
146 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 64 
147 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, paras 65-66. It should be noted that AG Trstenjak, in his opinion on 
Painer, also made an implication towards the requirement that a quote must be unaltered and distinguishable, 
para 210. 
148 C-476/17 Metall Auf Metall ECLI:EU:C:2019:624, para 72 
41 
 
dialogue isn’t possible when the quoted work cannot be identified.149 Thus, the expression 
’’for purposes such as criticism and review’’ is a lot more relevant than it first might appear. 
Not only does this passage contain the dialogue requirement, but the dialogue requirement 
itself contains the requirements of ’’unalteration’’ and ’’distinguishability’’. The quoting 
work must enter into a dialogue with the quoted work, which admittedly can happen for 
many purposes (criticism, review, analysis, tribute etc.). Unless the quoted work is 
recognizable as a foreign element, however, such dialogue cannot take place. 
3.5 Lawfully Made Available to the Public 
In Spiegel Online, the referring court asked the CJEU about the meaning of the expression 
’’lawfully made available to the public’’ in article 5(3)(d). Specifically, the referring court 
asked, when determining whether a work has been lawfully made available to the public, 
should the focus be on whether that work was published in its specific form with the author’s 
consent. The court began with emphasizing the expression ’’lawfully made available to the 
public’’ having to be understood as meaning ’’the act of making a work available to the 
public’’ – an interpretation it had established in Painer150. The court had compared the 
English, the French and the German versions of the expression and concluded that it always 
indicates towards the act of making a work available to the public. Furthermore, the 
quotation exception only covers works that have been lawfully made available to the public. 
The court concluded that a work has been lawfully made available to the public if it has been 
done with the authorization of the copyright holder or in accordance with a non-contractual 
license or a statutory authorization. The CJEU added, however, that it is up for the national 
courts to decide on a case-by-case analysis whether a work has been lawfully made available 
to the public.151 
3.6 Indicating the Source 
According to article 5(3)(d), a quotation must indicate the source, including the author’s 
name, unless this turns out to be impossible. The requirement of indicating the source is 
fairly self-explanatory and has received little elaboration over the years. For example, in his 
opinion on Metall Auf Metall, AG Szpunar merely stated that indicating the source can be 
 
149 C-476/17 Metall Auf Metall ECLI:EU:C:2019:624, para 73 
150 C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, para 128 
151 C-516/17 Spiegel Online ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, paras 85-89 & 91 
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done, for example, in the quoting work itself, in the description of the work or even the title 
of the work.152 It seems then that the source can be indicated in a myriad of ways. 
This requirement does contain some nuances that should be highlighted, however. In Painer, 
the referring court asked if the application of article 5(3)(d) is precluded in the event that the 
name of the author or performer is not attached to the work or other protected matter quoted. 
AG Trstenjak noted that, although the provision doesn’t define when indicating the source 
and the author should be considered impossible, the use of the word ’’impossible’’ (instead 
of lighter expressions, such as ’’unreasonably difficult’’) suggests that the criterion is fairly 
strict.153 This would coincide with the principle of high level of protection, enshrined in 
recitals 4, 9, and 10 of the InfoSoc. Directive. Furthermore, AG Trstenjak stated that the 
expression ’’turns out to be’’ implies that a certain amount of effort is expected of the person 
quoting the work to ascertain the source and the author’s name. However, AG Trstenjak also 
noted that, since the quotation exception exists to serve freedom of expression and freedom 
of the press, being unable to identify the author should not disqualify the exception from 
being used.154 Whether it should be considered to have been impossible to identify the author 
at any given case should be left to case-by-case analysis. A failure to comply with this 
requirement should, in Trstenjak’s view, result in an unlawful publication155. 
The court itself did not comment on AG Trstenjak’s interpretation nor did it elaborate the 
requirement in a similar fashion, but it did provide some insight on the matter. First, the court 
understood the requirement meaning that the quoted work has already lawfully been made 
available to the public.156 Furthermore, if one could reasonably well be able to identify the 
author and decides not to indicate the author, the quotation would amount to an unlawful 
publication.157 The court noted, however, that there can be instances where a lawful 
publication occurs without the author being indicated. In the case at hand, the court 
entertained the possibility that national security authors had made the contested photographs 
available to the public in accordance with article 5(3)(e) – an exception that requires no 
indication of the author.158 In that instance, the photographs would have been lawfully made 
available to the public without the author ever being indicated. Therefore, the subsequent 
 
152 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 68 
153 AG Trstenjak on Painer, para 194-195 
154 AG Trstenjak on Painer, para 196-197 
155 AG Trstenjak on Painer, para 202-205 
156 C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, para 139 
157 C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, para 141 
158 C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, paras 144-149 
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use of the photographs by the press in accordance with article 5(3)(d) would require the 
indication of the source but not necessarily the name of the author. 
Thus, it remains somewhat unclear when identifying the author should be considered 
impossible. AG Trstenjak seemed to suggest that a person wanting to quote a work might 
have to resort to a certain amount of investigative work if the author’s name isn’t 
immediately found alongside the work. The court’s interpretation appears to be somewhat 
lighter as it only seems to focus on the initial act of lawful publication. That is to say, if 
national security authorities made the works available in accordance with article 5(3)(e) and 
didn’t indicate the author – which they weren’t required to do –, the press would be free to 
quote the works while only indicating the source. Then again, the court stated that the press 
wouldn’t ’’necessarily’’ need to indicate the name of author in this kind of situation. This 
would suggest that the press might in some circumstances still have to indicate the author 
even if the original lawful publication of the work didn’t provide the name of the author. 
Presumably this would be required if the name of the author has surfaced since the original 
publication and is to be found with a reasonable effort. It appears then that AG Trstenjak 
was correct in his assumption that a certain amount of research is required of a person 
wanting to quote a work before concluding that identifying the author is impossible. It is 
also apparent that determining when this ’’impossibility standard’’ has been reached is a 
question for the national courts to answer in a case-by-case analysis. 
3.7 National Discretion 
3.7.1 Exceptions and Limitations 
In Spiegel Online, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany had referred to the CJEU several 
questions about the exceptions and limitations of the InfoSoc. Directive. In one of the 
referred questions, the referring court asked, in no uncertain terms, if the provisions of EU 
law on exceptions and limitations allow any discretion in terms of implementation in national 
law. Although not directly aimed at the quotation exception, the answer to this question is 
obviously relevant in order to fully understand the national discretion allowed to the member 
states in implementing the quotation exception. In addition, several statements are made 
directly about the quotation exception. The referring court had asked similar questions in 
Metall Auf Metall and Afghanistan Papers as well, albeit in slightly different context. The 
response of AG Szpunar and the CJEU was multilayered. Therefore, it is reasonable to go 
through the relevant points in an orderly manner. 
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AG Szpunar referred to his opinion on Metall Auf Metall where he had answered a similar 
question.159 In it, AG Szpunar had referred to Melloni where the CJEU, based on article 53 
of the CFR, confirmed that when an EU legal act calls for national implementation measures, 
the member states are free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights as 
long as it doesn’t conflict with the CJEU’s interpretation of the level of protection or 
compromise the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law (as was mentioned in sections 
2.4.2 and 2.6, exceptions and limitations typically exist to safeguard fundamental rights of 
the users of works).160 It follows from this that a member state cannot compromise the 
efficacy of an EU provision by applying its own national standards of protection of 
fundamental rights if the said provision is not contrary to CFR.161 This brings clarity to the 
question of the relationship of EU provisions and fundamental rights. 
When it came to transposing the InfoSoc. Directive and the latitude allowed to the member 
states therein, AG Szpunar had more to add. First, provisions that are worded 
unconditionally and in a mandatory way are just that and should be treated as such by the 
member states.162 This applies, in particular, to articles 2 to 4 of the directive. Just as was 
discussed in section 2.6.1, Szpunar noted that concepts that do not refer to the law of the 
member states are autonomous concepts of the EU. For this reason, he outlined that this must 
be true for the concept of ’’quotation’’ in article 5(3)(d).163 
Furthermore, AG Szpunar stated that the exclusive rights provided for ’’unconditionally and 
compulsorily’’ in articles 2 to 4 of the InfoSoc. Directive are subject only to the exceptions 
and limitations listed exhaustively in article 5(1) to (3) of the directive.164 Due to most of the 
exceptions and limitations being optional, the member states have a certain amount of 
latitude in the form of choice and wording of the exceptions they find most appropriate. Still, 
citing ACI Adam165, Szpunar reminded that member states aren’t allowed to introduce new 
exceptions nor extend the scope of the existing ones. He also made note that the degree of 
latitude is further limited since some of the exceptions ’’reflect the balance struck by the EU 
legislature between copyright and various fundamental rights’’. In those cases, failing to 
 
159 AG Szpunar on Spiegel Online, para 20 and on Metall Auf Metall, para 73 
160 C-399/11 Melloni ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, para 60. See also C-469/17 Afghanistan Papers 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, paras 30-32 
161 C-399/11 Melloni ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, para 63. See also AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 73 
162 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 75 
163 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 76 
164 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 77 
165 C-435/12 ACI Adam ECLI:EU:C:2014:254, paras 26-27 
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provide for certain exceptions and limitations in national law could be against the CFR. This 
raises the question whether the optional exceptions and limitations in article 5(3) are entirely 
optional at all. 
Thus, AG Szpunar concluded that the member states are obliged to provide for the exclusive 
rights laid out in articles 2-4 of the InfoSoc. Directive, noting that their scope is, at least to 
some extent, defined by CJEU case law. Those rights can only be limited by the exceptions 
and limitations listed in article 5 of the InfoSoc. Directive. No provision of any kind in 
national law can contest this obligation. Still, Szpunar stated that when it comes to 
implementing these provisions, the member states are nevertheless free as to the choice of 
’’form and methods’’ they consider appropriate, as is the case in directives.166 
The CJEU largely agreed with the Advocate General’s opinion on this question. The court 
made note that the InfoSoc. Directive seeks only to harmonize certain aspects of the law on 
copyright and related rights.167 This is evident by the fact that many provisions disclose the 
legislator’s intention to leave certain aspects to national discretion. With that being said, the 
court essentially ruled that a provision laid out in unequivocal terms without being qualified 
by any conditions must be regarded as a measure of full harmonization.168 In the case of the 
said provision not being subject in its implementation or effects to any measure being taken 
in any particular form, the provision demands full harmonization merely in the field of 
substantive law. This remark echoes AG Szpunar’s point as to the free choice of ’’forms and 
methods’’. In the end, however, the free choice of said forms and methods isn’t 
contextualized much further. A reasonable conclusion could be made that the member state 
discretion left in implementing exceptions and limitations is rather narrow. 
3.7.2 The Quotation Exception 
Although the CJEU had little to add on national discretion in regard to implementing 
exceptions and limitations in Spiegel Online, the court analyzed the quotation exception 
further. The court reminded that the national discretion available for member states in 
implementing a certain exception or limitation is always determined in a case-by-case 
analysis, in particular, according to the wording of the provision and the degree of 
 
166 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 78. Szpunar reaffirmed this view in his opinion on Spiegel Online, 
para 24 
167 C-476/17 Metall Auf Metall ECLI:EU:C:2019:624, para 82 
168 C-476/17 Metall Auf Metall ECLI:EU:C:2019:624, paras 83-86. The case at hand dealt with the exclusive 
rights of a phonogram producer in article 2(c) but, as per the reasoning used by the court, the argument can be 
extended to all of the provisions of the InfoSoc. Directive. 
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harmonization efforts intended by the legislator, based on the exception’s or the limitation’s 
impact on the smooth functioning of the internal market.169 Furthermore, the court outright 
stated that the quotation exception provision does not constitute full harmonization of its 
scope170. 
According to article 5(3)(d), a quotation must be ’’in accordance with fair practice, and to 
the extent required for a specific purpose’’. The court perceived this as built-in latitude 
afforded to member states in the implementation and application of the provision as the 
member states enjoy ’’significant discretion’’ in striking a fair balance between the relevant 
interests.171 Furthermore, the court stated that the section of the provision permitting 
quotations ’’for purposes such as criticism and review’’ is merely illustrative and allows 
further national discretion (although, as evident from section 3.4, this creates the requirement 
of entering into a dialogue with the original work). The court added that, according to the 
preceding legislative drafts, the exceptions and limitations in the InfoSoc. Directive are 
deliberately not dealt in detail and only lay the minimum conditions. It is then for the member 
states to define the detailed conditions of use, as long as they remain within the confines set 
out by the provision. 
3.7.3 The Boundaries of Discretion 
Regardless of this, the court reminded that the member states’ discretion is further limited 
by several factors. First, the member states aren’t always allowed to determine the 
parameters governing the exceptions and limitations in an unharmonized manner as they 
must be exercised within the limits imposed by EU law.172 This has been a consistent rule in 
CJEU case law and the court has held as such in cases like Painer173, Deckmyn174 and 
Afghanistan Papers175. The court stated that the discretion open to the member states is 
highly circumscribed by the requirements of EU law.176 The member states are only allowed 
to provide for the exceptions and limitations laid out in article 5 of the InfoSoc. Directive if 
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they comply with all the conditions laid down in that provision. The member states must 
also adhere to the general principles of the EU law, such as the principle of proportionality, 
which means that the measures adopted must be appropriate for the desired objective and 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it. 
Secondly, the court affirmed that, within the discretion enjoyed by the member states in 
terms of implementing exceptions and limitations, the objectives of the InfoSoc. Directive 
must not be compromised. These objectives include the proper functioning of the single 
market (recital 1) and a high level of protection for intellectual creation (recital 9). At the 
same time, the member states must secure the effectiveness of the exceptions and limitations 
in order to safeguard a fair balance between different rights and interests, as is demanded by 
recital 31 of the InfoSoc. Directive. The last point is something that the court has highlighted 
in the past in cases such as Football Association Premier League177 and Deckmyn178.179 
As the third requirement, the CJEU stated that the discretion available to the member states 
is further circumscribed by article 5(5) of the InfoSoc. Directive – in other words, the three-
step-test.180 Therefore, the exceptions and limitations provided for in the directive shall only 
be allowed in certain special cases provided that they do not conflict with normal 
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
copyright holder. Thus, with Spiegel Online, the court has reaffirmed that exceptions and 
limitations are indeed further subjugated by the conditions of the three-step-test. 
Fourthly, the court reminded that the member states must oblige with the principles of CFR 
when implementing EU law. The limitations and exceptions implemented must be based on 
’’an interpretation of the directive which allows a fair balance to be struck between the 
various fundamental rights protected by the European Union legal order’’.181 This 
conclusion was backed by cases such as Bastei Lübbe182 and UPC Telekabel Wien183 where 
the CJEU resorted to similar argumentation. Presumably, when talking about exceptions and 
 
177 Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:631, para 163  
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limitations, the intercepting fundamental rights are mainly the right to property (CFR article 
17) and, on the other hand, freedom of expression and freedom of arts (CFR articles 11 and 
13). As the CJEU is the body that interprets EU law, this fair balance is at least partly 
enshrined in the court’s case law. 
3.7.4 Fundamental Rights as Interpretive Boundaries 
In Spiegel Online, the CJEU was considering if the national courts are allowed to depart 
from the restrictive interpretation of articles 5(3)(c-d) in favor of one that ’’takes full account 
of the need to respect freedom of expression and freedom of information, enshrined in 
Article 11 of the Charter’’. The court reiterated the importance of striking a fair balance 
between various fundamental rights in the EU legal order.  Furthermore, national courts must 
interpret their national law in a manner consistent with the directive as well as refrain from 
interpretation that would be in conflict with fundamental rights or general principles of EU 
law. Therefore, any derogation from a general rule must, in principle, be interpreted 
strictly.184 
Still, the court reminded that the interpretation of exceptions and limitations must allow their 
’’effectiveness to be safeguarded and their purpose to be observed’’ to ’’ensure observance 
of fundamental freedoms’’.185 Interestingly, the court stated that, although the right to 
intellectual property is enshrined in article 17(2) of the CFR, there is nothing in the wording 
of the provision or the court’s case law that suggests that it must be protected as an ’’absolute 
right’’ – a viewpoint it has raised in numerous cases.186 The CJEU and other EU bodies as 
well as international organizations regularly refer to ’’absolute rights’’ as a subcategory of 
fundamental rights. What is typically meant by them are rights that are inviolable and cannot 
be limited or infringed on under any circumstances.187 Examples of these, in CFR, would be 
human dignity, right to life and prohibition of torture (articles 1, 2 and 4). Unlike these 
inviolable rights, the court seems to argue, the right to intellectual property can be interfered 
with to protect the rights of another or the public interest188. 
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Furthermore, the court pointed out that, according to article 52(3) of CFR, in so far as the 
rights guaranteed by the CFR correspond with those guaranteed by the European Convention 
on Human Rights189 (ECHR), their meaning and scope shall be the same as they are in 
ECHR. Freedom of expression is one of those rights (ECHR article 10(1)) and articles 
5(3)(c) and (d) exist to serve this right. It is clear from the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) that, when determining a fair balance between copyright and 
freedom of expression, whether the ’’nature of the ‘speech’ or information at issue is of 
particular importance’’ should be taken into account. If so, more weight should be given to 
freedom of expression. An example of this kind of speech would be speech or information 
’’in political discourse and discourse concerning matters of the public interest’’. The court 
then concludes by saying that, when striking a fair balance between author’s exclusive rights 
and copyright exceptions and limitations, the national courts must rely on an interpretation 
that fully adheres to the fundamental rights enshrined in the CFR while, at the same time, 
respecting the wording of the provisions and safeguarding their effectiveness. With this, the 
CJEU seems to have, to some extent, greenlighted the idea that fundamental rights can 
expand the scope of exceptions and limitations.190  
 
again, the provision doesn’t appear to use any weaker wording than some of those that protect absolute rights. 
In comparison to right to life (article 2) and prohibition of torture (article 4) respectively: ’’No one shall be 
condemned to the death penalty, or executed.’’ and ’’No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’’. Compare this to right to (intellectual) property (article 17(2)): 
’’Intellectual property shall be protected’’. Perhaps it would’ve been more sustainable to state that, although 
the protection of intellectual property must be secured, its level is determined by secondary legislation and case 
law. 
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4. DSM DIRECTIVE AND ONLINE CONTENT-SHARING 
SERVICES 
4.1 Introduction 
Now that the quotation exception has been analyzed rigorously and in-depth, its 
compatibility with the DSM Directive and online content-sharing services can be properly 
evaluated. For this purpose, it is necessary to have an overview of the DSM Directive. This 
section explains why the DSM Directive was initiated, what are its objectives and purpose, 
what changes did it experience before the finalized version and what are ’’online content-
sharing services’’ according to the directive. All of these topics are examined with a 
particular emphasis on matters concerning article 17 of the directive and the quotation 
exception. 
On 14th of June, 2016, the European Commission gave its proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM 
Directive).191 The explanatory memorandum of the document gives an explanation as to why 
the new directive is necessary. The reasons are similar as to why the InfoSoc. Directive was 
originally created. The evolution of digital technologies has changed how copyright-
protected works are created, produced, distributed and exploited. Thus, new uses, actors and 
business models have emerged. Cross-border uses have intensified and new opportunities 
for consumers have materialized. The commission stated that, although the objectives and 
the principles of EU copyright framework remain sound, there is a need to adapt it to these 
new changes to avoid fragmentation in the internal market. 
Very early on, the proposal brings up exceptions and limitations. Although exceptions and 
limitations are, according to the commission, harmonized on EU level, the proposal raises 
concerns whether these exceptions and limitations are ’’still adapted to achieve a fair 
balance’’ between the rights and interests of authors and users. As these provisions remain 
national, the commission argues that legal certainty around cross-border usage is unclear. 
Still, at this stage, the commission only identifies three areas that require union-level 
intervention, when it comes to exceptions and limitations. These areas are 1) digital and 
cross-border uses in the field of education, 2) text and data mining in the field of scientific 
research, and 3) preservation of cultural heritage. It is evident that, at least originally, the 
aim was very much in public policy objectives. Quotation, for example, is only mentioned 
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once; in recital 34, in relation to the rights granted to the publishers of press publications and 
exceptions and limitations that go along with it. This recital only deals with granting the 
publishers of press publications the same rights as the authors of other works guaranteed by 
the InfoSoc. Directive, as well as making them subject to the exceptions and limitations of 
the same directive.192 
The proposal also raises concerns related to the fact that, amidst the emergence of the digital 
age, the Internet has become the main marketplace for the distribution and access to 
copyright-protected content. In this new framework, rightholders have difficulties receiving 
proper remuneration for online distribution of their works and seeking licensing to their 
rights. This, the commission argues, could hinder European creativity and production of 
creative content. Therefore, the proposal perceives it necessary to guarantee the rightholders 
their fair share of the value that is generated through the use of their works. It is in this 
framework that the proposal aims to establish regulation that would improve the position of 
the rightholders to negotiate and receive remuneration ’’for the exploitation of their content 
by online services giving access to user-uploaded content’’. This section is important as it 
highlights the balancing exercise between the rights of authors and other rightholders and 
users of works in this new framework. It is against this background that the application of 
exceptions and limitations, such as quotation, must be evaluated.193 
Furthermore, in the explanatory memorandum, it is explained that the member state 
discretion in creating and adapting exceptions and limitations is limited due to exceptions 
and limitations being harmonized on EU level. In addition, because the issues raised by the 
proposal are cross-border in nature, national interference wouldn’t be sufficient. It is, 
therefore, necessary for the union to intervene in order to achieve full legal certainty and 
guarantee the high level of protection established by the EU legal order. The commission 
seems to suggest that the emergence of the digital age has brought about the Internet’s role 
as the main marketplace for the distribution and access to copyrighted content. In this new 
context, issues surrounding copyright are, by essence, cross-border in nature. This serves to 
further justify the nature of copyright exceptions and limitations as harmonized EU concepts. 
It is likely that national discretion in this field, at the very least, is not to increase in the 
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future. It is entirely possible, however, that union-level harmonization efforts will extend 
deeper.194 
It is important to note, however, that the DSM Directive merely exists to complement the 
existing copyright regulation, including the InfoSoc. Directive.195 The proposal identified 
several key issues where union-level intervention was required but it is not meant to be an 
overhaul of EU copyright rules per se. Rather, the directive is an attempt to realize a 
connected digital single market – one of the main goals of Jean-Claude Juncker’s political 
guidelines for the European commission laid out during his candidacy and which is 
perceived to be of great economic significance.196 It is then an extension and modernization 
effort of EU copyright while retaining the essence of existing EU copyright legislation. The 
proposal introduces certain mandatory copyright exceptions for public policy objectives and 
requires the member states to establish mechanisms to facilitate the clearance of copyright 
and related rights in certain fields. It will also impose certain obligations to information 
society service providers although, according to the commission, ’’these obligations remain 
reasonable in view of the nature of the services covered’’, referring to the impact these 
services have to online content market and the amount of copyright-protected content these 
services store197. 
Finally, the proposal touches on fundamental rights. The commission perceived it important 
to strengthen the bargaining position of authors and performers and the control that 
rightholders have on their copyright-protected content. The fundamental right to intellectual 
property (CFR article 17(2)), the commission would seem to argue, had not been properly 
safeguarded in the digital environment prior to this directive. It is through improving 
licensing practices and rightholders’ revenues that the proposal aims to tackle this imbalance. 
Still, the commission assures that the directive will have a limited impact to freedom of 
expression and information (CFR article 11) ’’due to the mitigation measures put in place 
and a balanced approach to the obligations set on the relevant stakeholders’’. It is evident 
that the proposal intends to strike a fair balance between different rights and interests in the 
digital environment as well.198 
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4.2 The Reception – Calls for a New Quotation Exception 
The proposal experienced a fair share of changes before the directive reached its adopted 
form. After being rejected in its initial form by the European parliament, a report199 on the 
proposal was presented, consisting of 86 amendments to it, some of which were approved. 
In addition to that, several committees within the union saw some areas of improvement in 
the proposal. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus will be on questions that deal with the 
quotation exception (or exceptions and limitations in general), the online content-sharing 
services and the relationship of the two. 
The Committee of Culture and Education raised concerns that the proposal doesn’t 
appropriately acknowledge the position of consumers that occupy the digital environment. 
According to the committee, it is important to realize that the users of these services aren’t 
just passive recipients, but also active contributors of content. In that framework, the 
committee raised concerns that the existing copyright exceptions and limitations aren’t 
capable of providing legal certainty to users in the digital environment. Rather, the 
committee proposed ’’a new exception governing the digital non-commercial, proportionate 
use of quotations and extracts of copyright-protected works or other subject-matter by 
individual users’’ as well as other exceptions and limitations to counterbalance the 
obligations laid out by (then)200 article 13 of the directive.201 
The Committee of Culture and Education believed that the existing quotation exception of 
the InfoSoc. Directive wasn’t sufficient for covering content that has emerged in certain 
information society services, uploaded by the users of the said services. In the proposed 
recital 21a of their opinion, the committee described these works as content uploaded by 
users that ’’sometimes comprises short extracts or short quotations from protected works or 
other subject-matter, which may be altered, combined or transformed’’.202 The committee 
went on to state that such use is nowadays widespread online and is often done for the 
purposes of illustration, caricature, parody, pastiche, criticism or review. The committee also 
believed that the new exception justifying this kind of content wouldn’t cause significant 
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economic harm to the rightholders – on the contrary, the user-uploaded content might even 
serve to advertise the work used therein. 
In its proposed recital 21b, the committee argued that this kind of user-uploaded content isn’t 
properly covered by the existing exceptions and limitations. The committee raised concerns 
that these circumstances would then create legal uncertainty for both users and rightholders, 
which leads to frustration and abuses. That is why the committee deemed it necessary to 
provide for a new specific exception to authorize ’’the short, proportionate and non-
commercial uses of extracts or quotations from protected works or other subject-matter’’ 
within content uploaded by a user.203 
Therefore, the committee proposed a new article 5a to introduce this new quotation 
exception. It was intended to cover the use of short extracts and quotations from works or 
other subject-matter, uploaded by users in the creation of a new work for the purposes of 
criticism, review, illustration, caricature, parody and pastiche. As per the wording, it would 
apply to digital, non-commercial and proportionate uses. It would’ve been subject to the 
existing conditions of the quotation exception (applies to works lawfully made available to 
the public, indication of the source when possible, use accordance with fair practice in a 
manner that doesn’t extend beyond the specific purpose). It would’ve applied without 
prejudice to the provisions of article 13 of the DSM Directive. The committee on the Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection concurred this idea by proposing article 5(b) titled ’’user-
generated content exception’’.204 In essence, this article would’ve been very similar to the 
exception proposed by the committee on Culture and Education – a new quotation exception, 
designed to cover for the perceived shortcomings of the existing exceptions and limitations 
in relation to digital uses. 
4.3 Online Content-Sharing Services 
The Committee on Legal Affairs, in their report, seemed to solidify the term ’’online content 
sharing service’’ – describing the services that, according to these committees, are in need 
of the new copyright exception.205 The committee described an online content-sharing 
service as an information society service ’’one of the main purposes of which is to store and 
give access to the public to copyright-protected works or other protected subject-matter 
uploaded by its users, which the service optimizes’’. Although the Committee on Legal 
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Affairs agreed that there is a need for a new exception to cover for the kind of user-uploaded 
content described by the Committee on Culture and Education, it did not draft a proposal for 
this new exception, unlike the previously mentioned Committees. 206 Rather, the Committee 
on Legal Affairs only proposed for article 13 of the DSM Directive that, while online content 
sharing services have an obligation, in absence of a licensing agreement, to take appropriate 
and proportionate measures leading to the non-availability of works or other subject-matter 
that infringe on copyright, these measures must not impact the availability of non-infringing 
works or other subject-matter207. Based on the earlier remarks, this would likely include 
works that fall into the ’’new quotation exception’’ proposed by the committees before. 
4.4 The Adopted Text – DSM Directive Finalized 
4.4.1 The Telos of the DSM Directive 
Despite facing severe initial challenges, the DSM Directive was ultimately adopted by the 
European parliament on 15th of April 2019 and published on 17th of May of the same year. 
The directive was greatly expanded and saw numerous amendments before reaching its 
finalized form.208 Issues surrounding the use of protected content by online content-sharing 
service providers was one of the main focus points of these changes. Indeed, many of the 
changes around these issues closely follow the concerns raised by the committees earlier. As 
a result, many existing recitals were amended as well as new ones were added. Through 
them, the telos of the final DSM Directive can accurately be interpreted. 
As an addition to the existing EU copyright framework, the DSM Directive seeks to achieve 
many of the same objectives pursued by other directives on copyright and related rights. 
These include securing the functioning of the internal market, high level of protection for 
rightholders and creating a framework in which exploitation of works and other subject-
matter can take place (recital 2). This kind of harmonized legal framework aims to contribute 
to the proper functioning of the internal market and stimulate innovation, creativity, 
investment and production of new content in the digital environment. However, the directive 
makes note of the fact that rapid technological advancements have changed ways in which 
works or other subject-matter are created, produced, distributed and exploited (recital 3). 
This results in the emergence of new business models and actors which in turn calls for 
future-proof legislation that doesn’t restrict technological development. Still, the directive 
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declares, the existing objectives and principles of the EU copyright framework remain 
sound. There is just a need to address legal uncertainty as regards to certain uses, such as 
cross-border uses. 
When it comes to online content-sharing services, the directive recognizes them as a main 
source of accessing copyright-protected content online (recital 61). While praising them as 
means of providing wider access to cultural and creative works, and offering great 
opportunities for cultural and creative industries to develop new business models, the 
directive raises concerns on some legal challenges that had not been addressed on union level 
prior to it. These challenges concern such themes as whether these services engage in 
copyright-relevant acts and whether they should obtain authorization from rightholders for 
content that is uploaded into these services by users. The goal is for the rightholders to have 
more influence in determining whether (and under which circumstances) their works or 
subject-matter may be used as well as to obtain appropriate remuneration for such use. This 
is to be done by establishing a licensing market between the rightholders and online content-
sharing services. Still, none of the provisions in the directive are intended to prejudice the 
existing exceptions and limitations in EU law and this kind of non-infringing content should 
not become unavailable due to cooperation between rightholders and online content-sharing 
service providers (recital 66). 
The 70th recital states that any step taken by online content sharing service providers and 
rightholders, to prevent the availability of works or other subject-matter which infringe on 
copyright, should be without prejudice to the application of exceptions and limitations – in 
particular to those which guarantee the freedom of expression of users. Therefore, users 
should be allowed to upload content generated by users ’’for the specific purposes of 
quotation, criticism, review, caricature, parody or pastiche’’ (italics added). According to 
the document, this is particularly important for striking a fair balance between fundamental 
rights laid out in the CFR, especially between freedom of expression and arts, and the right 
to intellectual property. What is especially interesting is that, according to the recital, these 
exceptions and limitations – including quotation – should be made mandatory. This is a stark 
contrast to the InfoSoc. Directive where these exceptions and limitations are presented as 
optional. Still, the mandatory quotation exception in the DSM Directive could be seen as 




4.4.2 Article 17(7) 
The provision that deals with the use of protected content by online content-sharing service 
providers – formerly article 13, now article 17 – was greatly expanded from its original form 
in the final version of the directive. The concerns raised by the numerous committees (which 
were discussed in sections 4.2-4.3) are clearly visible in the wording of the new article. In 
relation to preventing the availability of works and subject-matter that infringe on copyright 
and related rights, article 17(7) of the DSM Directive states the following: 
’’The cooperation between online content-sharing service providers and rightholders 
shall not result in the prevention of the availability of works or other subject-matter 
uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright and related rights, including where 
such works or other subject-matter are covered by an exception or limitation. 
Member States shall ensure that users in each Member State are able to rely on any of 
the following existing exceptions or limitations when uploading and making available 
content generated by users on online content-sharing services: 
(a) quotation, criticism, review; 
(b) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche.’’ (Underlines added) 
The first paragraph would appear to cover all the exceptions and limitations that any given 
member state has chosen to adopt. It appears to require the member states to respect those 
exceptions and limitations on online content-sharing services as well. The second paragraph, 
however, is more specific. The imperative ’’shall’’ requires the member states to adopt the 
set of exceptions and limitations below it when dealing with copyright-protected content on 
online content-sharing services. This is especially interesting when one considers that the 
DSM Directive only complements the InfoSoc. Directive while not replacing it. Therefore, 
this would suggest that whether or not a member state has chosen to adopt the corresponding 
exceptions and limitations in the InfoSoc. Directive (and while still retaining the right to do 
so or not), it still has to adopt these exceptions and limitations in regard to online content-
sharing services due to article 17(7) of the DSM Directive. Thus, it would be possible, using 
quotation as an example, for the member states to prevent the non-availability of user-
generated content that falls under the scope of the quotation exception on online content-
sharing services while, simultaneously, not allowing its subjects to rely on the quotation 
exception outside these services.209 Still, online content-sharing services have become the 
main marketplace for the distribution and access to copyright-protected content, as noted in 
 
209 This interpretation might only be theoretical as, as was pointed out in section 2.6.3, copyright exceptions 
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recital 61 of the DSM Directive. Therefore, it would be realistic to say that the 
aforementioned exceptions and limitations have, de facto, become largely mandatory on 
union level. 
The choice to make these specific exceptions and limitations mandatory in article 17 might 
be a conscious effort by the EU to preserve the kind of internet culture that has emerged in 
these services and was drawn attention to by the committee of Culture and Education and 
the committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (see section 4.2). The 
committees had referred to ’’user-generated content’’ that often consisted of ’’short extracts 
or short quotations from protected works or other subject-matter’’ for the purposes of 
’’illustration, caricature, parody, pastiche, criticism or review’’ as a way to describe this 
phenomena. Indeed, the public controversy sparked by article 13/17 of the DSM Directive 
was heavily centered around concerns for the continuation of this kind of internet culture – 
one with heavy emphasis on freedom of expression and information.210 In pursuant to 
safeguarding this kind of internet culture, it would be logical to enforce these specific 
exceptions and limitations on online content-sharing services. This can be interpreted as the 
EU not wanting to prevent this type of cross-border using and sharing of protected works 
and other subject-matter – if anything, it seeks to actively uphold it (although while 
attempting to rebalance the rights and interests of different stakeholders). 
4.4.3 The Quotation Exception in the DSM Directive 
Article 17(7) is the only article that mentions the quotation exception in the DSM Directive. 
There is no sign of a new, ’’extended quotation exception’’ that was proposed by the 
committees mentioned before (see section 4.2) – the exception that was, according to the 
committees, required to safeguard the internet culture described above. In fact, there is no 
mention of it in the entire directive, let alone article 17. Additionally, nothing in the wording 
suggests that the quotation exception in article 17(7)(a) of the DSM Directive differs from 
the quotation exception in article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive. On the contrary, article 
17(7) speaks explicitly of ’’existing exceptions or limitations’’, strongly indicating the 
unchanged nature of these provisions.211 After all, the DSM Directive is based on and 
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complements the existing EU copyright framework, but it doesn’t replace it. It is then fair to 
conclude that the quotation exception in article 17(7)(a) of the DSM Directive is the same 
exception as the one in article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive. 
Therefore, despite the concerns raised by the committees, the legislator evidently didn’t find 
it necessary to create a new quotation exception for the purposes of article 17 but found the 
existing quotation exception sufficient. This interpretation isn’t without its merits because, 
although the previously mentioned committees raised noteworthy points about the need to 
safeguard user-generated content online, it isn’t immediately obvious why the existing 
quotation exception wouldn’t cover these kinds of uses. ’’Short extracts or short quotations 
from protected works or other subject-matter’’ for the purposes of ’’illustration, caricature, 
parody, pastiche, criticism or review’’ were the words used to describe this user-generated 
content. Although the term ’’quotation’’ has its origin in literary works and is strongly 
associated to them212, the quotation exception in the EU copyright framework is certainly 
not that restricted. 
The CJEU had implied as early as in Painer that the quotation exception can be applied to 
photographic works.213 In his opinion on Metall Auf Metall, AG Szpunar stated that he sees 
no reason why the quotation exception couldn’t be applied to other categories of works than 
literary works, in particular, musical works.214 The CJEU confirmed AG Szpunar’s view that 
the exception can indeed be applied to musical works, strongly implying that it can be 
applied to all kinds of works.215 Furthermore, in his opinion on Spiegel Online, AG Szpunar 
claimed that, ’’at the present time’’ (in comparison to the origins of the word ’’quotation’’), 
he didn’t see it ’’inconceivable’’ that the quotation exception could be applied to works such 
as musical works, cinematographic works and works of visual art.216 Although neither 
confirming or denying AG Szpunar’s assertion, the CJEU described the quotation exception 
as the use of ’’a work’’ or ’’of an extract from a work’’ without discriminating between 
different categories of works.217 
Thus, based on existing CJEU case law, there do not seem to be any arbitrary restrictions to 
the scope of the quotation exception in terms of different categories of works. This can make 
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one conclude that the existing quotation exception is indeed capable of responding to 
challenges brought by the digital age without having to extend its scope. Still, there are 
certain features to the quotation exception that can make the provision’s compatibility with 
online content-sharing services and the user-generated content therein complicated. These 
issues shall be elaborated on next.  
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5. The Quotation Exception – A Future-Proof Provision? 
5.1 DSM Directive and Quotation – in Search for a Fair Balance in Modern 
Copyright Environment 
As of writing this thesis, the DSM Directive is still very new. Although it is in force, the 
directive is still in the process of national implementation and hasn’t experienced any 
application. In fact, the only case brought up in relation to it, to date, is one by Poland, 
brought on 24th of May 2019.218 Admittedly, the case is precisely about article 17. The 
Republic of Poland aims to no less than annul article 17(4)(b) and article 17(4)(c) or, 
alternatively, annul article 17 in its entirety. Poland argues that the provisions in question 
infringe on freedom of expression and information guaranteed by article 11 of the CFR – 
precisely the values that the exceptions and limitations, like quotation, aim to safeguard. It 
should be noted that Poland isn’t alone with these grievances219. It is then evident that some 
of the concerns around these fundamental rights in relation to the DSM Directive remain, 
despite the EU’s apparent attempt to reach a compromise. Keeping the telos of the exceptions 
and limitations in mind, these concerns ultimately come together into one question: are the 
existing exceptions and limitations able to strike a fair balance between the rights of different 
stakeholders on online content-sharing services? Are they, in that sense, future-proof? 
These kinds of questions are inherently somewhat complicated. What is ultimately ’’fair 
balance’’ can only be found in case-by-case analysis and is subject to differ depending on 
the viewpoint. To answer these questions in any satisfactory way, they should be approached 
from a certain, fixed viewpoint. For the purpose of this thesis, they must be approached from 
the viewpoint of the EU copyright framework. Therefore, one must consider the meaning 
and the purpose of the quotation exception as part of the EU copyright framework. These, in 
turn, must be compared to the relevant provisions and recitals of the DSM Directive. 
It is important to remember, however, that the balancing exercise between different 
fundamental rights is, naturally, a two-way street. Ever since Promusicae, the CJEU has 
ruled that, when transposing an EU directive, the member states must rely on an 
interpretation which ’’allows a fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental 
rights protected by the Community legal order’’.220 Based on existing CJEU case law and 
copyright directives, it is safe to say that the union has so far chosen to maintain a high level 
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of protection of intellectual property, traditional to continental Europe. Indeed, this isn’t 
immediately unjustifiable from a fundamental right viewpoint either, given that the right to 
property – including intellectual property – is a fundamental right. On top of that, the CJEU 
has, in the past, ruled that provisions of a directive which derogate from a general principle 
established by that directive must be interpreted strictly.221 In Infopaq, the CJEU plainly 
stated that the requirement of authorization from the rightholder for any reproduction of a 
protected work is the general principle established by the InfoSoc. Directive. Exceptions and 
limitations to this general principle, therefore, are exemptions that require strict 
interpretation. In Infopaq, the court implied that the requirement of strict interpretation calls 
for these provisions to be interpreted in light of article 5(5), the three-step-test. 
Nevertheless, the CJEU has shown numerous times that it is willing to use fundamental 
rights -based arguments to ultimately determine the scope of certain concepts of EU law, 
such as those concerning copyright.222 It has done this for several exceptions and limitations, 
but also in regards to author’s exclusive rights. In cases such as Renckhoff and GS Media, 
the court relied on fundamental rights -based argumentation in order to determine the 
relationship of hyperlinking to ’’communication to the public’’.223 In GS Media especially, 
the CJEU outlined how too far reaching exclusive rights would unreasonably restrict the 
users’ rights to freedom of expression and information. Although slightly different in the 
referred questions and outcomes, the court made it clear in both cases that the Internet is of 
particular importance to freedom of expression and information, and that ’’hyperlinks 
contribute to its sound operation as well as to the exchange of opinions and information in 
that network characterized by the availability of immense amounts of information’’. It would 
appear that the court, in these cases, recognized the Internet’s potential, significance and 
special character as well as its importance to fundamental rights, and aligned its 
interpretation of copyright provisions accordingly. 
On top of balancing between different fundamental rights, the CJEU has reminded the 
member states of, when transposing EU directives, accounting for the principle of 
proportionality, one of the guiding principles of EU law, which states that measures adopted 
must be appropriate for attaining their objective and must not go beyond what is necessary 
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to achieve it.224 In Deckmyn, the court held that this is true also for (in that case) the parody 
exception as parody is a way to practice freedom of expression as opposed to the 
rightholders’ rights in articles 2 and 3 of the InfoSoc. Directive.225 In Painer, the court stated 
that quotation is also to serve freedom of expression as opposed to the reproduction right of 
the author.226. This would indicate that articles 2 and 3 (and presumably 4) of the InfoSoc. 
Directive essentially embody the right to intellectual property, as it is guaranteed in CFR. 
The court emphasized, however, that the act of striking a fair balance is ultimately the result 
of a case-by-case analysis where all circumstances must be taken into account. As explained 
earlier, this can also take place on grounds of moral rights - despite the fact that moral rights 
weren’t subject to harmonization efforts. 
5.2 The Dynamic Quotation Exception 
It is against this background, as well as the telos of the DSM Directive, that the quotation 
exception should be analyzed. After Painer, Metall Auf Metall and Spiegel Online, it would 
seem apparent that the CJEU has chosen to implement a broad definition of quotation. The 
emergence of new ways of creation and new forms of works in on itself will likely not render 
the exception ineffective. In principle, it is safe to say that the quotation exception can be 
applied to all kinds of works and subject-matter – even those, that have only recently 
emerged on online content-sharing services. 
Furthermore, at least in theory, the quotation exception shouldn’t cause any major 
fragmentation of the internal market in regard to the implementation of the directive. Article 
17(7) creates a mandatory obligation for the member states to respect the existing quotation 
exception which has a notable case history. Due to the cross-border nature of online content-
sharing services, the choice to make these exceptions and limitations mandatory makes sense 
as a necessity for harmonization efforts.227 Based on existing case law, it is known that 
member states must follow all the conditions laid out in article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. 
Directive. The court has also given numerous rulings on how certain expressions in the 
provision should be interpreted. On top of this, the member states must also achieve the level 
of protection of fundamental rights provided by the CFR (as interpreted by the court). The 
court has also emphasized that the degree of harmonization (on any given exception or 
limitation) is decided on a case-by-case basis which, in turn, is based on their impact on the 
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smooth functioning of the internal market. Although the member states have certain built-in 
tools for national discretion (what is ’’fair practice’’ and ’’the extent required by the specific 
purpose’’), the CJEU has plenty of legislative power to define the scope of the quotation 
exception further if it deems it necessary in order to achieve the objectives of the DSM 
Directive.228 It is then important to remember that, although certain problems may emerge 
in introducing the quotation exception to online content-sharing services, many of them can 
likely be properly addressed through CJEU interpretation. 
The court has repeatedly exercised this legislative power in relation to the quotation 
exception already. In Painer, relying on fundamental rights, the court issued that it was 
irrelevant whether the quotation is made as part of a work protected by copyright or, on the 
other hand, as part of a subject-matter not protected by copyright – in either cases, the 
application of the exception isn’t excluded.229 The court explicitly explained that this is done 
to favor freedom of expression over the author’s interest in being able to prevent 
reproductions of extracts of his work. Furthermore, in Metall Auf Metall and Spiegel Online, 
the court plainly stated that the right to intellectual property isn’t an inviolable, absolute 
right. In those cases, as explained in section 3.3.2, the court went outside the traditional 
definition of quotation in favor of one that would apply to all kinds of works – an approach 
suggested by AG Szpunar and one that the court had seemingly greenlighted in Painer. 
Although not done on grounds of fundamental rights, this interpretation certainly favors 
freedom of expression and information over the right to property. It is arguably yet another 
instance where the CJEU moved away from a strict interpretation of exceptions (as 
established in Infopaq.) to one that strikes a fair balance between different fundamental 
rights. After all, one could have reasonably expected the court to retain the traditional 
meaning of quotation (quotation of literary works), which it chose not to do. 
5.3 Quotation and Freedom of Expression – Trouble in the Horizon? 
5.3.1 Dialogue and Unalteration 
However, although the scope of the quotation exception has greatly been expanded through 
CJEU case law, it has arguably also been severely diminished. To elaborate this, one must 
revisit what was established in Metall Auf Metall. As explained in section 3.4, the expression 
’’for purposes such as criticism and review’’ turned out to have a far larger impact on the 
 
228 This is precisely what the court did in Deckmyn, for example, by determining that ’’parody’’ must enjoy 
uniform interpretation throughout the union, to ensure its effectiveness as a means to balance copyright and 
freedom of expression. See Jongsma, 2017 
229 C-145/10 Painer ECLI:EU:C:2011:798, paras 134-136 
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application of the quotation exception than one might have expected at first glance. AG 
Szpunar interpreted this as meaning that a quotation must enter into ’’some kind of 
dialogue’’ with the work quoted, which could be confrontational, a tribute or it could take 
place in any other way as long as there is interaction between the quoted work and the 
quoting work. A quotation should be incorporated to the quoting work, without modification, 
in a manner that it can be distinguished as a foreign element (being unaltered and 
distinguishable). In his opinion, these two conditions make the distinction between quotation 
and plagiarism as well as make dialogue with the two works possible. The CJEU agreed with 
AG Szpunar on these points and ruled accordingly. 
This, in turn, drew a fair share of criticism from experts who would’ve preferred the court 
wield its legislative power differently.230 The European Copyright Society (ECS) criticized 
AG Szpunar’s perception of quotation as ’’recklessly conservative’’ and argued that a more 
substantial role to the concepts of ’’fair balance’’ and ’’fair practice’’ should’ve been 
given.231 Citing Painer, ECS noted that the CJEU considers the intention of the quotation 
exception to be to ’’strike a fair balance between the right to freedom of expression of users 
of a work or other protected subject-matter and the reproduction right conferred on authors’’. 
ECS expressed that, not only should the quotation exception cover sound samplings, but it 
should do so even when the quoted work isn’t distinguishable from the quoting work – in 
other words, even when a listener wouldn’t be able to tell that another person’s work or 
subject-matter is being used. ECS argued that this kind of interpretation would be in line 
with articles 13 (freedom of arts) and 11 (freedom of expression and information) of the 
CFR. ECS also appeared to be doubtful that the requirements presented by AG Szpunar can 
truly be said to arise from the everyday meaning of ’’quotation’’. 
Daniël Jongsma also criticized AG Szpunar’s interpretation of the quotation exception for 
very similar reasons.232 First, he found that Szpunar’s argument, that the phrase ’’for 
purposes such as criticism and review’’ in article 5(3)(d) creates a requirement for the 
quoting work to enter into a dialogue with the quoted work, was ’’very weak’’. Citing 
Painer, he stated that safeguarding the right to freedom of expression is the raison d’être of 
the provision and, although not strictly against the wording of the provision, Szpunar’s 
interpretation greatly reduces its effectiveness to do so. He implied that, in the case of 
 
230 See. Jongsma IPRI 2019 and Bently & others 2019 
231 Bently & others 2019, p. 2-4 & 17-21. 
232 Jongsma IPRI 2019, p. 8-11 
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ambiguous wording, such as in this case, more weight should be given to freedom of 
expression as, according to him, a more permissive interpretation on that front would not by 
itself seriously hamper the rights of authors. This is because a quotation would still have to 
fill the requirements of fair practice and necessity, as per the wording of article 5(3)(d) of 
the InfoSoc. Directive. Therefore, Jongsma argued, the systemic arguments based on 
international law and fundamental rights ’’far outweigh the relatively weak textual 
arguments’’. He added that a requirement to enter into a dialogue does not arise from every 
day meaning of ’’quotation’’ as, as an example, using the phrase ’’to be or not to be, that is 
the question’’ is universally understood as a quotation of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, whether an 
interaction with the quoted work follows next or not. For the same reasons, he rejected the 
requirement of unalteration, arguing that it is common in arts to refer to the reuse of elements 
from a prior creation as ’’quotations’’, regardless of whether they stand out as foreign 
elements in the quoting work or not233. 
The critique seems to be mostly aimed at these perceived unnecessary conditions that the 
quotation exception has to meet which would result in a severe imbalance between different 
fundamental rights. In other words, these conditions would restrict freedom of expression 
and information without proper justification in relation to the right to property. These 
concerns appear to be valid as the requirement for a ’’dialogue’’ (as well as unalteration and 
distinguishability) may seriously affect the provision’s capability of safeguarding freedom 
of expression. In Metall Auf Metall, the court ruled that the quotation exception doesn’t apply 
to phonogram sampling, unless that use has the intention of entering into dialogue with the 
work from which the sample was taken. AG Szpunar, in his opinion, admitted that 
’’sampling in general, and the use of the phonogram at issue in the main proceedings in 
particular, do not satisfy those conditions. The aim of sampling is not to enter into dialogue 
with, be used for comparative purposes, or pay tribute to the works used’’.234 Therefore, 
although the quotation exception, in theory, applies to all kinds of works, these two 
additional requirements might de facto disqualify certain types of works. This is arguably 
true for sound sampling, but it is not impossible to imagine other types of uses that do not 
conform to these additional requirements. It is arguably the experience of many that a lot of 
the user-generated content generally encountered on online content-sharing services do not 
 
233 On this point, See also Bently – Aplin 2018, p. 18-21 
234 AG Szpunar on Metall Auf Metall, para 67. 
67 
 
concern themselves with unalteration, distinguishability or dialogue with the original work, 
as the quotation exception would require. 
5.3.2 Indicating the Author – Hinderance to Creativity? 
There is another requirement to the quotation exception that has been addressed to a lesser 
extent in this regard. As mentioned earlier, article 5(3)(d) also dictates that a quotation is 
permissible provided that the source, including the author’s name, is indicated, unless this 
turns out to be impossible. Although indication of the source and the author’s name is fairly 
self-explanatory, it is not as easy to answer when one should be considered exempted from 
this requirement. In other words, at what point should one be allowed to conclude that 
identifying the author is impossible is nowhere near as obvious. As explained in section 3.6, 
both AG Trstenjak and the CJEU seemed to agree that at least some research effort and 
vigilance can be expected of a user on this front. 
It is reasonable to expect that this requirement may encounter similar problems as the 
dialogue -requirement. As explained before, article 17 received plenty of backlash precisely 
on grounds of fundamental rights. Activists and experts alike were worried about the 
negative impact that the provision might have on an internet culture that heavily emphasizes 
freedom of expression, information and arts. Online content-sharing services, where the user 
is both a consumer and a contributor, have a large role in this framework. Not only do they 
serve as platforms to share and distribute works and other subject-matter, they also serve as 
sources and means to introduce new, user-uploaded works. 
Just as this plurality of user-generated content typically does not concern itself with 
unalteration, distinguishability and dialogue with the original work, same is no doubt true 
when it comes to indicating the source. Amidst the environment of ever-increasing amount 
of new works and information it is common to encounter works origin of which are unknown 
and difficult to identify. The author’s identity is easily lost in the circulation of information, 
art and expressions, typical to online environment. Therefore, how much effort is to be 
expected of one to identify the author before being allowed to deem it impossible – that is a 
question that might become topical in the future. In the vastness of these online platforms, 
the relevant information simply being ’’available’’ is hardly going to suffice. The CJEU can 
wield significant legislative power in determining the proper standard.  
The CJEU, as well as the EU as a whole, have clearly recognized the Internet’s importance 
and significance to freedom of expression, information and arts. Indeed, it was precisely for 
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this reason that the court considered hyperlinking a form of quotation – because it contributes 
to the sound operation of freedom of expression and information online. The quotation 
exception exists to safeguard freedom of expression, which means that its importance is 
amplified in the online environment. It is then entirely possible that the CJEU will adopt a 
relatively low standard of ’’impossibility’’ for the purposes of article 17(7), should it ever 
need to address that question. At the same time, it wouldn’t be alien for the continental 
European tradition to resort to high protection of intellectual property. Taking it to the 
extreme, however, would make it difficult to realize the objectives of the DSM Directive 




6.1 Quotation – an Autonomous Concept of EU Law 
Although the CJEU hasn’t plainly stated so, it is all but certain that ’’quotation’’ is an 
autonomous concept of EU law. According to the established principle in CJEU case law, 
when a provision makes no express reference to the law of the member states – which article 
5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive does not do – for the purpose of determining its meaning 
and scope, they must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the 
union. This is done to secure uniform application of EU law as well as the principle of 
equality. This rule has resulted in many concepts in EU copyright law becoming autonomous 
concepts of EU law, including one of the exceptions and limitations – the parody exception. 
Therefore, there is every reason to conclude (and no reason not to conclude) that quotation 
is an autonomous concept of EU law. 
In Metall Auf Metall and Spiegel Online, it can clearly be seen that the CJEU has adopted an 
autonomous meaning to the concept of ’’quotation’’ – a definition of the term within EU 
copyright law. A quotation is described as ’’a use, by a user other than the copyright holder, 
of a work or, more generally, of an extract from a work for the purposes of illustrating an 
assertion, of defending an opinion or of allowing an intellectual comparison between that 
work and the assertions of that user’’. This, according to the court, is the meaning of 
quotation in everyday language. By taking into account the legislative context in which it 
occurs as well as the purposes of the rules of which it is part, it forms the autonomous concept 
of ’’quotation’’ within EU law. Due to the telos and the meta-telos of the legal framework 
of which it is part – that is to say, the purpose of EU copyright law as well as the EU as a 
whole – the concept of quotation has expanded far outside the confines of its traditional 
meaning. It is applicable to all kinds of works. Not just to literary works, but also to musical, 
photographic, cinematographic and works of visual art – just to name a few. It can also be 
lawful to quote works in their entirety provided that all the conditions in article 5(3)(d) of 
the InfoSoc. Directive are met. The provision is also welcoming of new methods of quoting 
made possible by technological advancement, such as hyperlinking. 
Article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc. Directive also requires that a quotation meets certain 
conditions in order to be a lawful exception to copyright. The expression ’’for purposes such 
as criticism and review’’ means that the quoting work must enter into some kind of dialogue 
with the quoted work. The dialogue can be confrontational, a tribute or take place in any 
other way, as long as it is there. In relation to this, it is required that the quotation is unaltered 
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and distinguishable. The quotation must be incorporated into the quoting work without 
modification in a way that it is easily distinguishable as a foreign element. This, according 
to the CJEU, is required in order for any dialogue between the two works to be possible to 
take place. Additionally, the provision states that quotations are only permissible out of 
works which have been lawfully made available to the public. This is understood as the act 
of making a work available to the public with the authorization of the copyright holder or in 
accordance with a non-contractual license or a statutory authorization. Finally, unless it turns 
out to be impossible, the source, including the author’s name, must be indicated. This 
requirement can be fulfilled in numerous ways and isn’t confined to any particular form. 
The quotation exception, however, does not constitute a full harmonization. In fact, there are 
plenty of ways in which national courts can exercise discretion and maintain their own 
copyright traditions. National courts can ultimately decide whether a work has been lawfully 
made available to the public. They also have the final say in whether the quoting work has 
entered into a dialogue with the quoted work or not. Furthermore, national courts can 
determine when identifying the author for the purpose of indicating his name in a quotation 
shall be considered impossible and, subsequently, the user should be exempted from this 
rule. Last, but certainly not least, the national courts get to determine if a quotation is in 
accordance with fair practice and the extent of a quotation is appropriate for the specific 
purpose. These final two requirements in article 5(3)(d) appear to be built-in conditions 
designed to be left to national discretion. The courts have a reasonably wide free reign to 
consider all the relevant factors and legitimate interests that the stakeholders might have in 
any given case. 
Nevertheless, there are some interpretive boundaries circumscribed by EU law that member 
states must respect. First, member states aren’t allowed to implement the exceptions and 
limitations in an unharmonized manner. If a member state chooses to provide for the 
quotation exception in their national copyright law, they must comply with all the conditions 
laid out in article 5(3)(d). They must also comply with the general principles of EU law, such 
as the principle of proportionality. Furthermore, national courts aren’t allowed to 
compromise the objectives of the InfoSoc. Directive, such as establishing a high level of 
protection for authors and ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market. The 
member states must also safeguard the effectiveness of the exceptions and limitations and to 
permit observance of their purpose. For the quotation exception, that purpose is to secure the 
freedom of expression of users. The national courts must also take into account that article 
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5(3)(d) is subservient to article 5(5), the three-step-test. This means that the quotation 
exception is only to be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with normal 
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author. Lastly, the national courts must rely on an interpretation that allows a fair balance to 
be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the CFR. When dealing with 
the quotation exception, this balance is namely to be found between freedom of expression 
and right to property. 
6.2 Compatibility with Online Content-Sharing Services 
The quotation exception in EU copyright law was designed from the beginning to be future-
proof – compatible with technological development as well as new ways of creating and 
using protected content. Ever since Painer, the CJEU was open to the idea of quoting 
photographic works. Since then, the court has made it clear that the quotation exception is 
applicable to all kinds of works as long as all the conditions of the exception are met. 
Furthermore, in EU copyright law, any references to ’’short’’ extracts or quotations have 
been absent from the start even though similar restrictions haven’t been unusual to quotation 
exception provisions in other legal frameworks, including earlier versions of the Berne 
Convention. Instead, quotations are permissible to the extent required by the specific 
purpose, which, presumably, can justify quoting works in their entirety. After all, arbitrary 
restrictions to the extent of a quotation wouldn’t sit well with works such as photographs, 
paintings and short poems. 
Furthermore, EU has recognized the Internet’s significance and potential as well as considers 
its sound operation important to fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and 
information. The importance of fundamental rights, which are safeguarded by numerous 
exceptions and limitations, is amplified in the online environment. It is precisely for this 
reason that the EU decided to make certain exceptions and limitations – including the 
quotation exception – mandatory for online content-sharing services in spirit of article 17(7) 
of the DSM Directive. That is to say, the cooperation between online content-sharing service 
providers and rightholders in preventing the availability of infringing works on these 
services must not result in the unavailability of works covered by these exceptions and 
limitations, such as the quotation exception. The CJEU has also repeatedly stated that the 
right to property is not an inviolable right while, simultaneously, emphasized the role of 
exceptions and limitations in safeguarding fundamental rights. 
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Although the DSM Directive, especially article 17, was largely designed to respond to 
several injustices that the authors were facing in the digital age, the EU clearly isn’t about to 
disregard the rights and interests of the users either. On the contrary, based on the history of 
CJEU case law, it is relatively safe to assume that whenever a case concerning an exception 
or limitation presents the opportunity to widen its scope and strengthen its purpose, the CJEU 
often takes an approving stance, unless the interpretation would prejudice the author’s rights 
and interests to an unreasonable extent. The smooth functioning of the internal market in the 
digital age no doubt favors freedom of expression, arts and information. Thus, if the rights 
and interests of the author aren’t severely harmed as a result, the court is likely to adopt the 
interpretation that supports this objective, just as it has done so far. Therefore, in addition to 
the quotation exception already being quite versatile, the CJEU has plenty of legislative 
influence to develop the quotation exception for the purposes of the DSM Directive in the 
future, provided that the wording of the provision permits it. 
Nevertheless, there are certain qualities to the quotation exception that might make its 
application in spirit of article 17(7) of the DSM Directive troublesome. The requirement for 
dialogue particularly, as well as the requirements for unalteration and distinguishability 
associated to it, has garnered plenty of criticism from copyright experts. This requirement 
raises concerns that it might restrain freedom of expression to an unreasonable extent without 
proper justification in relation to right to property. On top of that, technological development 
as well as online content-sharing services have enabled new ways of creation that, while 
quote from existing works, don’t typically concern themselves with unalteration, 
distinguishability or having a dialogue with the quoted work. This is definitely the case with 
sound sampling (Metall Auf Metall) but can easily apply to many other kinds of works often 
encountered in these services. Problems might be present with other requirements too, such 
as indicating the source, including the author’s name, unless it turns out impossible. 
Uncertainty around when one can consider identifying the author ’’impossible’’ can no 
doubt stifle with stimulation of creativity and innovation, especially when one takes into 
account the vastness of these platforms and the circulation of information, arts and 
expressions therein. 
The societal development to the digital age has been fairly rapid – arguably too quick for EU 
law to keep up as it typically develops at a slow pace. By the time the proposal for the DSM 
Directive had been presented, online content-sharing services had already become part of 
everyday life and popular platforms for consuming, distributing, sharing, exploiting, 
73 
 
downloading and uploading user-generated content. This largely unregulated new 
phenomenon quickly developed its own culture – one with heavy emphasis on freedom of 
expression, arts and information of users. The unprecedented backlash received by the DSM 
Directive from experts, activists and ordinary citizens is, therefore, somewhat 
understandable. Of course, the EU isn’t obligated to uphold the kind of culture these online 
content-sharing services had adopted. In fact, if the right to property is severely being 
violated in this environment, the EU could be argued to have a duty to intervene. Still, in an 
attempt to develop a legal framework for copyright for online content-sharing services and 
to strike a fair balance between different fundamental rights, the EU should consider the 
objectives of the DSM Directive carefully. 
Although the directive indeed aims to maintain a high level of protection for rightholders, it 
also seeks to secure the functioning of the internal market and to create a framework in which 
exploitation of works and other subject-matter can take place. It also aims to stimulate 
innovation, creativity, investment and production of new content in the digital environment. 
Furthermore, the directive praises online content-sharing services as means of providing 
wider access to cultural and creative works and offering great opportunities for cultural and 
creative industries to develop new business models. For reaching these goals, adopting 
excessively strong author’s rights would surely be counterproductive. 
At this point, one can only speculate if the CJEU has already done so with the quotation 
exception. It does then beg the question whether the DSM Directive would’ve indeed 
required a new, extended quotation exception, as some of the EU committees had suggested. 
Demands for more flexibility in the field of copyright exceptions and limitations in EU 
copyright law are certainly nothing new.235 In an attempt to rebalance the rights of authors 
and rightholders in opposition to the rights of users in the mostly unregulated environment 
of online content-sharing services, one cannot help but wonder if the EU has tipped the scale 
too strongly on the former side – at least, when it comes to the quotation exception. 
 
235 See. F.ex. Senftleben 2010 
